Michigan Law Review
Volume 68

Issue 5

1970

Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current Methods and Some
Proposals for Reform
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current Methods and Some Proposals for
Reform, 68 MICH. L. REV. 926 (1970).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol68/iss5/4

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COMMENTS
Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current Methods and
Some Proposals for Reform
During the past decade, a great deal of effort has been expended
at all levels of government in the United States to enhance the prosperity of the poor and underprivileged elements of society. Much
legislation has been passed-especially at the federal leveP-but it
has been incomplete in that its main thrust has been simply to increase the income levels of poor people without a corresponding effort to ensure that they receive their money's worth as consumers.2
As a result, the long-standing evil of fraud in the market place has
not been significantly reduced, but has contributed to the serious
economic and social problems that confront contemporary society.3
It has been estimated, for example, that, in purely monetary terms,
Michigan consumers lose as much as one hundred million dollars
annually to fraudulent merchants. 4 This loss is particularly devastating since the victims of the unethical and deceptive practices are
very often persons with low incomes who cannot easily bear financial
loss.5 Consumer fraud thus tends to reinforce the vicious circle of
poverty with its attendant social ills.
Fraudulent business practices have also contributed to the violent upheavals that have occurred in urban ghetto areas in recent
years. A study of the 1967 Detroit riots concluded that a primary
cause of the violence that erupted was the sense of frustration that
the people of the inner city felt as a result of (I) constant exposure
to dishonest merchants, (2) perpetual indebtedness because of too
liberal and too costly extensions of credit, and (3) the inability to
I. See Manpower Development and Training Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2571-628 (Supp. IV,
1965-1968); Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-994d (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
See also Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 802, 83 Stat. 676 (special tax
allowance for low-income taxpayers).
2. See Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 746 (1967).
3. For an examination of the problem of consumer fraud in the United States,
especially as that problem relates to the inner city, see H. BLACK, Buy Now PAY
LATER (1967); D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967); W. MAGNUSON 8e J. CARPER,
THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE (1968). The only comparable work on consumer
fraud in Detroit is Focus: Hope 68, a study of comparative food and drug prices and
services in the Detroit metropolitan area.
4. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E., at 1, col. 4.
5. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE PooR PAY MoRE 105-36 (1967). A study by the Federal Trade
Commission of the customers of those merchants in the District of Columbia most
likely to engage in fraudulent sales practices and to charge inordinately high prices
showed that the average purchaser was supporting an abnormally large family (3.6 to
4.3 members) on an income below the average for the district (.$4,176 as compared to
an average of $6,920). FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLIIIENT CREDIT AND RETAIL
SALES PRAcnCES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS x, 35-44 (1969) [hereinafter FTC
CREDIT STUDY].
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seek redress for economic grievances because of the complexity and
inaccessibility of the legal system.6
There has been some governmental response to the critical problem of consumer fraud, although to date it has been manifestly
inadequate. President Nixon recently announced the entry of the
federal government into the fight against fraud in the market place
with the statement that "[c]onsumerism-Upton Sinclair and Rachel
Carson would be glad to know-is a healthy development that is
here to stay." 7 Unfortunately, there has been little effective federal
legislation8 or enforcement, and the consumer remains substantially
unshielded by federal law from businessmen, who, like Babbit, are
"nimble in the calling of selling houses for more than people could
afford to pay." 0 As a result, the consumer must look to state and local
governments for whatever protection is available against unscrupulous merchants. The states too, however, have been less than zealous
guardians of consumer interests. In most states, consumer fraud
problems are dealt with by statutes that are confusing, disjointed,
and incomplete,10 and by procedures that are cumbersome and inefficient.11 But perhaps the most serious problem is one of misplaced
priorities. Seldom do officials ·who are charged with the responsibility
of safeguarding consumer interests direct their primary efforts toward
the element of society most seriously and persistently exploited in
the market place-the low-income consumer.12
The State of Michigan is certainly no exception to the general
pattern, insofar as consumer protection is concerned. Its consumer
fraud legislation is ill-conceived, and its enforcement procedures are
inadequate. But most discouraging is the state's apparent lack of
concern about the seriousness of the problem of fraud in the market
6. That study was undertaken by the Detroit Free Press and The Detroit Urban
League. See also NATIONAL .ADVISORY COMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 274 (1968).
7. Address to Congress on Consumer Affairs, Oct. 31, 1969, in N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1969, at 22, col. I.
8. There has been some such legislation, however. Fair Packaging & Labeling Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-77, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
9. S. LEWIS, BABBIT 1 (1922).
10. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Tra11saclion Problems, 48 B.U. L. REv. 559, 583-88 (1968); Saxbe, The Role of the

Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of
the Ohio Attorney General, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 901-04, 908-15 (1968); Note, The
Regulation of Advertising, 56 CouJM. L. REv. 1018, 1057-72 (1956).
11. Note, supra note 10, at 1063-65; Developments in the Law-False Advertising,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1123 (1967).
12. See Installment Sales: The Plight of the Low Income Buyer, 2 CoLUM. J.L. &:
Soc. PROB. l (1966); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1969). For an examination of the current inability of the legal system to protect consumers, see D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, at 155-70; Hester, Deceptive

Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy'!,
1968 Duia: L.J. 831.
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place, a problem which daily confronts poor and uneducated con•
sumers; the various units of governments in Michigan simply have
not been willing to provide the funds and manpower necessary to
combat the problem successfully.13
A necessary adjunct to any legal reform in the area of consumer
protection is the establishment of a consumer education program
that is designed to apprise citizens-particularly those who lack adequate education-of their rights as consumers and to advise them
where to go for governmental assistance before as well as when they
have been defrauded. Studies have shown that most defrauded consumers do not at present utilize the resources of the state governmental agencies that are responsible for consumer protection, either
because they are unaware of the existence of such agencies, or because
they lack faith in the government's willingness or ability to help the
average citizen.14 Nevertheless, although serious attempts must be
made to convince consumers that they need not passively accept the
economic injury inflicted upon them by dishonest merchants, it is
:first necessary to provide a meaningful set of remedies that may be
invoked in their behalf. It is to that initial requirement that this
study of Michigan law is primarily directed.
J. THE STATUTORY FRAf..iEWORK

A. Criminal Statutes
In most states, criminal statutes have traditionally provided the
primary means for combatting fraudulent business practices.15 It
has been generally conceded, however, that attacking fraud in the
market place with criminal sanctions has been patently unsuccessful, 10
13. For a discussion of this problem, see pt. II infra.
14. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, at 175-78. It has been reported that even if defrauded consumers know where they may go to seek governmental assistance, nine out
of ten will not pursue any remedy at all. Usually their distrust of all governmental
institutions is so great that they cannot understand that help, as well as harm, can be
received from them. See generally Murphy, Attorneys for the Poor View the U.C.C.C.,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 298, 303-04 (1969). The author contends that the lower one's position on the socio-economic scale, the less likely he is to be aware of the potential
value of legal services.
15. The primary attack on consumer fraud has been through regulation of advertising, accomplished by the use of criminal statutes similar to the model act prepared
by Printer's Ink magazine in 1911. Such statutes have been adopted in 43 states, including Michigan. See Saxbe, supra note 10, at 901-04; Note, supra note 10, at 1058-65;
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.33 (1967); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.41 (Page 1962).
Most states have also adopted criminal statutes prohibiting the obtaining of money
and property by false pretenses. Saxbe, supra note IO at 901-02; Comment, Translating
Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Action, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 395, 424-26 (1966). See Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967
(1953); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4836 (1963).
16. See Saxbe, The Role of Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer
Frauds and Crimes Section of the Ohio Attorney General, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 897, 902
(1968); Developments in the Law-False Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1018-19,
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and several states have abandoned that method in favor of a more
flexible approach involving administrative remedies.17 Nevertheless
criminal provisions are still among the primary "weapons" in the
fight against consumer fraud in Michigan.18 The two criminal statutes invoked most often19 against fraudulent merchants are the statute prohibiting false advertising20 and that prohibiting the obtaining
of money under false pretenses.21
The Michigan false-advertising statute prohibits placing before
the public with the intention of selling merchandise any "untrue,
deceptive, or misleading statement."22 Convictions under such statutes have been exceedingly rare 23 because of the insistence of the
courts that there is no criminal offense absent proof that the seller
intended to deceive, as well as to sell to, the public.24 Moreover, not
even every intentionally misleading statement is actionable; the
courts have decided that allowance must be made for normal "puffing" of a product.215 Thus the trier of fact must in every case decide
whether the allegedly misleading statement was merely an opinion of
the seller which a reasonable man would have recognized as such or
whether it was a calculated falsehood upon which a buyer could have
reasonably relied.20 Only in the most blatant cases, therefore, have
convictions been obtained; and even in those cases the defendant has
generally received a suspended sentence or a fine-a small price to
pay for operating in an illegal manner. 27
I 122-23 (1967); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Action, 114 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 395, 424-27 (1966) [hereinafter Effective Programs].
17. For a list of states that have enacted deceptive-practice legislation, see note 287
infra.
18. Interview with Jay Nolan, Chief, Fraud and Special Services Section, Wayne
County Prosecutor's Office, Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 22, 1969 [hereinafter Nolan Interview]. Consumer fraud presents one of the few instances of crime in society about
which there is little if any public outcry. Apparently people do not mind being robbed
with a pen.
Criminal statutes are used in many jurisdictions. See Effective Programs, supra
note 16, at 424-26; Letters on file at the Michigan Law Review from David S. Shannon,
Deputy District Attorney, Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon, Oct. 10, 1969; Robert Brown, Asst. State Attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Dade County), Florida, Oct.
6, 1969; Eugene Gold, District Attorney, Kings County (Brooklyn), New York, Oct. 1,
1969.
19. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
20. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.33 (1967).
21. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1967).
22. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.33 (1967).
23. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1123.
2•1. People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 460, 3 N .W.2d 841, 843 (1942).
25. People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 460, 3 N.W.2d 841, 843 (1942); People v. Clarke,
252 App. Div. 122, 297 N.Y.S. 776 (1937).
26. People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 3 N:W.2d 841 (1942).
27. Only two decisions under this statute have been reported, and both of those
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The statute prohibiting the obtaining of money or other property
under false pretenses is just as ineffective. In a consumer fraud case
arising under that provision, the state must prove the seller's intent
to defraud, his use of a false pretense, and reliance by the purchaser
upon that pretense.28 Furthermore, the false pretense must refer to
an existing fact; statements concerning acts that are to take place in
the future are not sufficient to sustain a conviction.29 Thus, for example, if a seller tells a buyer that a watch has seventeen jewels when
in fact it has only four, he is criminally liable; but if the seller tells
the buyer that he will repair the watch free of charge, and then later
refuses to do so, he is not criminally liable. Finally the defendant
must have actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement; it is not
enough if he is merely negligent in making the statement.30
The strict interpretation given the false-pretenses statute, especially the requirement that the false pretense relate to an existing
fact, severely limits the usefulness of that provision in normal consumer fraud cases, such as that in which a merchant promises to
deliver a certain article to a buyer and in fact delivers another, that
in which the seller refuses to honor a guarantee, or that in which the
seller makes false representations concerning the amount of future
payments that the buyer is obligated to make or the length of time
he has in which to make them. The obvious concern of the courts in
restricting the scope of the statute is to prevent the criminal sanction
from being used to enforce contractual obligations or from being
invoked to mollify the victim of a bad bargain.31 But this policy of
preventing criminal penalties from being used in what are essentially
civil controversies would not be undermined by a strict provision
making false promises actionable only in cases in which there is proof
that the promiser, at the time the promise was made, did not intend
to perform.32 Yet such a provision would afford the consumer more
protection than he has under the current interpretation of the falsepretenses statute.
cases were prosecuted during the Second World ·war when gasoline was at a premium.
In one of the cases, the defendant portrayed his brand of gasoline as "grade-one,"
although the jobber's manual clearly indicated that it was not. People v. Austin, l!0l
Mich. 456, 3 N.W.2d 841 (1942). Even with the clear-cut falsehood in that case, however, prosecution and conviction may perhaps be attributed more to the strong feelings
against war profiteering that prevailed at the time than to the fact that the case was
an easy one for the prosecution.
The information relating to sentencing practices was obtained in the Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
28. People v. Lee, 259 Mich. 355, 356, 24l! N.W. 227, 228 (1932).
29. People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 91, 81 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1957).
30. People v. Larco, 331 Mich. 420, 429, 49 N.W.2d 358, 363 (1951).
31. See Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Saxbe, supra
note 10, at 902.
32. See Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 425. Indeed, in order to make their
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However, even in the rare case in which all the elements of an
offense under the false-pretenses statute are present, it is doubtful
that many prosecutors will invoke the statute against businessmen
because of the traditional hesitancy on the part of officials at all
levels of law enforcement to apply criminal statutes to white-collar
crimes.33 That hesitancy may be particularly pronounced with respect
to the false-pretenses statute because of the relatively severe penalties
attached to conviction; indeed, if the amount taken by false pretenses
is more than one hundred dollars, the crime is a felony. 34
In addition to the false-advertising and false-pretenses statutesthe two most commonly used consumer protection laws in Michigan
-the state legislature has also enacted seventy-four "product statutes" and seventy-six "service statutes."35 Each of these statutes prohibits fraud in the sale of a specific type of goods or services, and
each carries a criminal penalty which is enforced by one of a multitude of governmental agencies ranging from the Department of
Agriculture to the Cemetery Commission.36 These provisions, however, contribute little to the over-all fight against fraud in the market
place. Because the power of enforcement has been delegated to so
many disparate agencies, resources have been dissipated, coordination
has been made impossible, and, most important, consumer access
false-pretense statutes more functional, two states have amended their criminal codes
to provide that false promises made with the intent not to perform are actionable.
NEB. R.Ev. STAT, § 28-1207 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:lll-l (1969). Other states have
reached the same result by judicial construction. See, e.g., People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326,
193 N.E. 150 (1934); Commonwealth v. Green, 326 Mass. 344, 94 N.E.2d 260 (1950);
see Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 425-26. Several recent decisions of the Michigan
Court of Appeals have involved future promises-the failure to make good on postdated checks-but in each case there were also misrepresentations concerning present
facts upon which the victim was found to have relied. See People v. Niver, 7 Mich.
App. 652, 152 N.W.2d 714 (1967); People v. Vida, 2 Mich. App. 409, 140 N.W.2d 559
(1966).

33. See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1123; Effective Programs, supra
note 16, at 426.
34. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1967).
35. For as complete a compilation as is presently available, see MICHIGAN CoNSU!lt:£RS' COUNCIL, SUM!IIARY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION (May 1969).
36. E.g., ~ICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 289.501 (1967):
[W]ithin this state no person shall manufacture, offer or expose for sale, keep in
possession with intent to sell, or sell any ground buckwheat containing any
product of wheat, com, rice or other foreign substance unless each and every
package thereof be distinctly and legibly branded or labeled "Buckwheat Flour
Compound" ••••
Violation of this section is a misdemeanor. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 289.505 (1967).
Similarly, the Insurance Bureau of the Department of Commerce is empowered to
bring criminal action against any insurance broker who fraudulently obtains a renewal
of a life insurance policy without the explicit consent of the insured. MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 500.2023 (1967). Fifty-four of these statutes attempt to control various
fraudulent practices by specific prohibition and criminal sanction. See generally
MICHIGAN CONSUMERi' CouNCIL, supra note 35.
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has been inhibited.37 Moreover, by providing for only a criminal
penalty, the legislature has denied the enforcement agencies needed
flexibility in framing effective remedies and thus has encumbered
the utility of the statutes. Most of these provisions could be eliminated with the enactment of a broad deceptive-practices statute38
such as that proposed by the Federal Trade Commission30 or the
Council of State Governments. 40 While some details of the proposed
acts differ, both acts place the enforcement authority in a centralized
agency that may seek both criminal and noncriminal sanctions.41 In
addition, both acts share a common definition of what is prohibited:
"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."42 The advantage
of such a broad prohibition is obvious; under it a centralized enforcement agency can deal with a variety of deceptive practices that previously may have cut across various jurisdictional lines or that may
not even have been covered by pre-existing legislation. In addition,
the broad language offers added flexibility for dealing with new
types of fraud and deception not prevalent at the time of enactment.43
37. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Transactions, 48 B.U. L. REv. 595, 595-600 (1968).
38. A few of these provisions, however, although designed to prohibit fraudulent
sales practices, deal with matters of public health or safety that should remain within
the jurisdiction of a specialized agency. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.451.462 (1967), providing criminal penalties or injunctive relief against dealers who mislabel toxic substances. This statute is enforced by the Department of Agriculture.
39. FTC, UNIFORM UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAw [here•
inafter FTC UNIFORM ACT], reprinted in FTC, REPORT ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM 3 (1969) [hereinafter FTC PROTECTION PROGRAM).
40. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, CoNSUMER PRO•
TECTION ACT (1970 Draft) [hereinafter CSG ACT]. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is also completing studies on the Uniform Consumer
Sales Practices Act [hereinafter NCCUSL ACT]. That proposed act is now in its third
draft.
41. Under the FTC uniform act and the CSG act the administrator of a state
deceptive-practices statute is to be the attorney general, whereas the NCCUSL act
makes no recommendation as to where the centralized authority should lie. With
regard to the FTC proposed act, see FTC PROTECTION PROGRAM, supra note 39, at•
tachment A, at C. (1968). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 2, 4, 5 (Supp.
1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-7 (Supp. 1953). A few states have placed consumer
protection programs in another regulatory agency. See, e.g., CONN. G.E;N. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-111-ll5a (Supp. 1969) (Commissioner of Consumer Protection).
42. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1964). This language
has been incorporated into § 2 of the FTC Uniform Act and into § 2, alternative I, of
the proposed CSG act. For those states not wishing to repeal present unfair-competition laws, the CSG act, § 2, alternative 2, also defines prohibited conduct as simply
"[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or _practices in the conduct of any trade of commerce •••. "
43. Some states have adopted language similar or identical to that of the existing
Federal Trade Commission Act (see note 42 supra). E.g., HAWAII REv. LAws § 205A-l.l
(Supp. 1965); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (Supp. 1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 19.86.020 (Supp. 1968). This language requires the state courts and the administrator
of the state legislation to draw heavily upon decisions construing the Federal Trade
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The Attorney General of Michigan has urged the adoption of such
legislation; 44 but the attitude of the legislature, although it has
changed from "hostility to cool approval,'' 45 does not foreshadow
quick passage. In the meantime, dishonest merchants who prey upon
poor consumers can find comfort in the knowledge that they are
better off than the Mafia; they do not have to pay bribes.

B. Civil Statutes Regulating Retail Sales
The first comprehensive civil statute regulating retail sales was
enacted in Indiana in 1935.46 Michigan followed soon thereafter with
the enactment in 1939 of the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales
Act.-¼7 But unlike the Indiana statute, which had a broad scope, the
Michigan statute regulated merely the form of the contract to be
used in an installment sale of an automobile, requiring the inclusion
of a statement of the cash price, the amount of the down payment,
the amount of any unpaid balance, and the amount of finance
charges.48 That Act remained the only retail-sales regulation in
Michigan until 1951 when the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act
was adopted.49 During the decade of the fifties, many state legislatures
enacted comprehensive retail-sales legislation. 50 The Michigan legislature, however, lagged behind until 1966 when it passed the Retail
Commission Act. A provision both in the suggested CSG act [§ 3(b)] and NCCUSL act
(§§ 4b, 9) goes further, however, and requires that any rules or regulations issued by

the state administrator be in conformity with such decisions. Although the state administrator should avoid conflicts between state and federal law as much as possible,
there does not seem to be any compelling reason to limit the authority of the state
to provide greater protection to its citizens. In the event that a standard less stringent
than the federal provision is adopted by the state, the consumer would still have the
higher level of protection under the federal act from interstate deceptive activities.
Still, the availability of federal legislation should not preclude the states from experimenting with increased regulation if current measures are not sufficient. For
example, a state could insist that retail merchants not use "list prices" in advertising
goods unless those prices are, in fact, the normal prices at which the goods are sold.
This requirement would probably greatly help the consumer in assessing the true
value of a so-called discount or sale price. It seems, however, that the doctrine of
compatibility with FTC decisions would prohibit such a requirement since the FTC
has established a lesser standard. See Baum, The Consumer and the Federal Trade
Commission, 44 J. URBAN LAW 71, 81-82 (1966).
44. Interview with George Platsis, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Consumer Protection Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan,
Oct. 7, 1969 [hereinafter Platsis Interview].
45. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E., at 1, col. 4.
46. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-902 to -934 (1961); see Note, Retail Installm,mt Sales Legislation, 58 CoLtJM. L. REv. 854, 856 (1958).
47. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN,§§ 566.301-.302 (1967).
48. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 566.302 (1967).
49. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 492.101-.138 (1967).
50. See Hogan, A Survey of State Installment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38
(1958).
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Installment Sales Act51 which is an all-goods statute.62 During the
same session, the legislature enacted the Home Improvement Finance
Act regulating the form of home improvement contracts which are
for services having a value exceeding three hundred dollars. 58
These Michigan statutes, like almost all retail-sales legislation in
the United States, are basically disclosure-oriented and for the most
part do not rigorously regulate the substantive content and the conditions of retail-sales agreements. 54 The Retail Installment Sales Act,
for example, requires that all installment contracts be in ·writing and
contain a notice to the buyer in at least eight-point type that he is
entitled to a copy of the contract, that he should not sign the contract
if it contains any blank spaces, and that he is entitled to a partial
return of the finance charge if the balance is prepaid. 55 The Motor
Vehicle Sales Finance Act and the Home Improvement Finance Act
contain similar provisions and basically do not go much beyond the
requirement that pertinent information be disclosed on the face of
motor vehicle sales contracts and home improvement contracts.56 The
state statutory requirements for disclosure of financing terms in installment contracts have been superseded by the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act; 57 and the Michigan legislature has stipulated
that the federal standards, which include the requirement that the
seller furnish the installment buyer with a statement of the annual
percentage rate of finance charges, are absorbed into the present
51. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.851-.872 (1967).
52. For a comprehensive compilation of both all-goods and limited-purpose state
legislation, see B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION, chart II, at 254-55,
chart 17, at 293-300, chart 19, at 312-22 (1965).
53. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.1101-.1431 (1967).
54. Hogan, supra note 50, at 44-47; Note, Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 58
CoLuM. L. REv. 854, 866-72 (1958); see B. CURRAN, supra note 52, chart 17, at 293-300.
There is a considerable difference between regulating the manner in which substantive
terms are presented to the buyer and regulating the terms themselves. The retail-sales
acts, for instance, require the sales price to be disclosed but do not place any limit
upon that sales price, which could be done with an unconscionability clause. See
NCCUSL Acr § 2(c); Note, Inadequacy of Consideration as a Factor in Determining
Unconscionability Under Section 2-302 of the UCC, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1248 (1969). The
greatest failing of retail-sales legislation, however, is that it does not deal at all with
the inducements for the sale or with the negotiations before the siguing of the contract.
This precontract stage is crucial; once the consumer has assented, the signing itself is
a mere formality.
55. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.853(a) (1967).
56. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN._§§ 445.1202(b), 492.ll2(d) (1967). In addition to establishing· disclosure requiiements,' the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act provides that all
persons engaged in the selling of motor vehicles under installment sales contracts, as
well as the financial institutions taking assignments of such contracts, must be licensed
by the state. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.103 (1967). ·The Act vests authority in the
Financial Institutions Bureau to grant such licenses. See text accompanying notes 227-34
infra.
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-41 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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Michigan regulatory scheme. 58 For all practical purposes, the Michigan statutes, combined with the Federal Act, provide for the disclosure of virtually all the information that is relevant to the consumer who is purchasing goods on an installment basis. A significant
question remains, however, as to whether the disclosure provisions
actually protect the average consumer in the market place.
In order to answer that question, it is necessary to understand the
purposes which disclosure provisions are intended to serve. Basically,
disclosure statutes attempt to provide buyers on the credit market
with the opportunity to compare the credit terms of various sellers;
they do so in order to assist the consumer in obtaining the best bargain and thereby to reduce the possibility that the buyer will be
victimized by an unscrupulous merchant. Theoretically, such statutes
could be of assistance to relatively sophisticated middle- and upperclass buyers, who are able to understand the financial information
presented in installment contracts and loan agreements, and who
are able to choose freely among the various credit merchants because
they offer merchants a low credit risk. 59 Most of these sophisticated
consumers, however, are aware that it is cheaper to borrow money
from a bank or to buy from a reputable merchant than it is to borrow
from a sales finance company or to buy from an "easy credit" merchant. For these consumers, then, the disclosure provisions, which
are aimed at high-priced finance companies and unscrupulous merchants, may as a practical matter be of little use. 60
Poor and uneducated lower-class consumers, on the other hand,
lack the ability to understand the disclosed financial information
and are thus unable to shop comparatively in the credit market. 61
In addition, they suffer from gullibility fostered in part by ignorance
and in part by the desire to compensate for a secondary position in
society by purchasing material goods. 62 Moreover, most poor urban
58. No. 30, [1969] Mich. Acts 69-70 (to be codified in MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 445.lll); No. 31, [1969] Mich. Acts 70 (to be codified in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 445.851); No. 35, [1969] Mich. Acts 77 (to be codified in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 492.122).

59. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
4-5 (1969); Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 746-54 (1967).
60. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM.
L. RE\'. 445, 455-69 (1968); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 4-5 (1969). The latter article is an excellent answer to those who

believe disclosure is the cure-all for consumer credit problems. For a more favorable
view of disclosure statutes, see Jordon & ·warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A
Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (1966). It should also be mentioned that today much
purchasing is done with all-purpose credit cards. It is doubtful that the interest
charges of such cards enter into the consumer's decision whether to use them instead of
a loan or other form of financing.
61. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE PooR PAY MORE 13-15 (1967).
62. See Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 883, 917-19 (1969); D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, at 12-13.
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consumers have little desire and even less ability to shop in stores
outside the ghetto; 63 their generally poor credit ratings all but preclude the possibility of their receiving credit in stores catering to the
middle and upper classes.64 Finally, the poor consumer seldom shops
for credit separately from the purchase of goods. As a consequence,
the retail merchant dealing with poor consumers also provides financing and is able to conceal finance charges in the selling price and thus
to offer very attractive, but deceptive, credit terms. 65
The primary weakness of disclosure-oriented retail-sales statutes,
therefore, is that they are not designed to combat the evils that
beset the poor, inner-city consumer. Deceptive sales practices, unscrupulous merchants, and exorbitant prices and credit terms are
facts of life in the ghetto-but not in the shopping centers of the
suburbs. Yet the disclosure statutes are designed so that only educated
and economically prosperous consumers can benefit from them. Perhaps the greatest danger in such legislation is not that it fails to
provide a solution to consumer fraud problems, but that enough
people will think that it does provide a solution that any further
reform will be precluded.
.Although most retail-sales legislation is disclosure-oriented, the
statutes in many states, including Michigan, do attempt some regulation of certain sales practices that are particularly harsh upon consumers.66 The practices receiving the most statutory attention are the
various cut-off devices by which financial institutions, as assignees
of consumer obligations, can avoid the consumer's claims and defenses
which arise out of the original sale and which are raised in actions
to compel the consumer to pay the amount due on the sales contract.
The holder-in-due-course doctrine is one such device. The doctrine allows the assignee of a consumer obligation to compel the
consumer to satisfy that obligation, but it does not subject the
63. See FTC CREnrr STUDY, supra note 5, at 42-45, in which it was found that 70%
of the customers of low-income (ghetto) retailers never purchase on credit from other
than a low-income retailer. This statistic is significant in light of the fact that most
low-income consumers can purchase only on credit. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3,
at 14-15.
64. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE PooR PAY MORE 98 (1967); Note, Consumer Legislation and
the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 757 (1967).
65. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, supra note 60, at 6-7.
Since mark-ups are so much higher in the ghetto (see FTC CREDIT STUDY, supra note
5, at 25-28), and since the poor have little opportunity to be exposed to a different
price structure, there is much more flexibility in the list prices, and additional credit
charges may be absorbed without significant competitive disadvantage. The requirements of federal and state disclosure statutes can be easily met since no concealment of
the actual finance charge is involved; no disclosure statute prohibits a merchant from
raising the selling price rather than credit charges.
66. See generally Hogan, supra note 50; MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.853, .864,
.1203, 492.114(b) (1967). See also MICHIGAN CONSUMER'S COUNCIL, COMPARISON OF THE
uccc WITH MICHIGAN CREDIT LEGISLATION table 4, at 15-18 (Aug. 1969).
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assignee to the claims-such as failure of consideration, fraud, or
breach of warranty-that the consumer may have against the merchant who contracted with him for the sale of the goods. In the
typical installment sale, the buyer executes a promissory note to the
seller in conjunction with the sales contract. In order to meet current capital needs, many merchants sell both the note and the contract to a finance company or bank. 67 Under article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), if the assignee purchases the instrument
for value, in good faith, and without notice of any defense or claim,
the assignee is a holder in due course68 and as such is not subject
to the defenses or claims of the consumer which arise out of the
sale. 60 The drafters of the UCC, in an attempt to preserve the free
transferability of commercial paper, adopted a "subjective" standard
which requires that the assignee have actual knowledge of a claim or
defense in order for him to be denied holder status.7° Courts in
some states, however, recognizing the harshness of this test, have held
that when there is a "close connection" between the seller and the
assignee-such as when the finance company provides forms for the
negotiable instrument and approves the terms of the sale71 or when
there is duplication of management between the seller and assignee72
-the subsequent purchaser must be denied holder status.73 The
67. The assignee is then able to enforce the contract for the balance due, to enforce the security agreement and obtain possession of the goods, or to do both. This
process is examined in Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk for Defective
Goods, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 782, 783-85 (1954). There is some conflicting evidence concerning the e.xtent to which the holder-in-due-course doctrine is a real problem. The
FTC CREDIT STUDY, supra note 5, reported that low-income retailers assigned only
20% of their paper. The Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau, on the other hand,
estimates that over 90% of automobile purchase contracts and notes are assigned by
dealers and that a large percentage of paper generated by other retailers, with the
exception of department stores, is assigned as well. Interview with Alvin J. Trierweiler,
Director, Consumer Finance Division, Financial Institutions Bureau, Department of
Commerce, Lansing, Michigan, Oct. 14, 1969 [hereinafter Trierweiler Interview]. See
note 112 infra. Most poverty lawyers feel that the doctrine is a principal obstacle to
combatting fraud. See Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the U.C.C.C., 44 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 298 (1969).
68. UNIFORM COM!IIERCIAL CODE, § 3-302 [hereinafter UCC].
69. ucc § 3-305.
70. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 63-65 (1966).
71. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766,
771, 214 P.2d 819, 822 (1950); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 S.2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
72. See United States v. Schaeffer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940) (assignee of the
note was a wholly owned subsidiary of the assignor); Toms v. Nugent, 12 S.2d 713
(La. App. 1943) (finance company wholly owned by the president of the company
which had sold an automobile to the defendant).
73. For discussions of this subject, see Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due
Course of Commercial Paper, 1958 WASH. U. L.Q. 177; Jordan&: Warren, The U.C.C.C.,
68 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 387, 434 nn.131-32 (1968); Littlefield, supra note 70; Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-
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theory of these decisions is that holder status must be denied either
because the transfer was not made in good faith74 or because the
financial institution is so related to the seller that it is reasonable to
consider the institution a party to the original transaction.75 Other
courts have gone even further and have held that under certain
circumstances-such as when the financial institution has knowledge
of a dealer's poor business reputation76 or of his fraudulent business
practices77-the institution must be charged with "objective notice"
of any defenses available to the consumer that would have been
discovered by a reasonable investigation. Under this theory, the
institution acquiring the consumer's obligation is liable to the extent of any of the buyer's claims which are based upon the original
transaction.78 These decisions have not been universally accepted,
however, and many courts have rejected any deviation from the
actual-knowledge standard envisioned by the Code.70 Michigan seems
to have adopted the latter course; 80 hence the consumer can probably
of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 667 (1968); Comment, Consumer
Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv.
505.
74. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 1~7 S.W.2d 260 (1940); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819
(1950); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 S.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Unico v. Owen, 2!12 A.2d
405, 50 N.J. 101 (1967); see Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut•Off
Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 514.
75. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S:W.2d 260 (1940); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819
(1950); see Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer
Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 514.
76. Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 590-91, 181 A.2d 809, 818
(1962).
77. Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 58-59, 195 A.2d 115,
118 (1963); Jaeger &: Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 20 Utah 2d 100, 433 P.2d 605 (1967).
See also Local Acceptance Co. v. Kinkade, 361 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1962), in which the
court held that knowledge and approval by the finance company of the seller's general
practice of using chattel mortgages and promissory notes contemporaneously with
sales contracts was sufficient to deny holder-in-due-course status to the finance company.
The court rejected the idea that knowledge of the specific note and sales contract was
needed.
78. Such decisions are not in accord with the standard set by the draftsmen of the
UCC, but they represent the judicial distaste for the various cut-off devices, at least
when consumers are involved. See Littlefield, supra note 70.
79. E.g., Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Janzewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967);
Buchett v. Allied Concord Fin., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P .2d 186 (1964). See also Jordan &:
Warren, supra note 73, at 434; Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 445, 469 (1968).
80. The Michigan courts have held that actual knowledge of a claim or defense is
necessary before holder-in-due-course status will be denied. Alropa Corp. v. King's
Estate, 279 Mich. 418, 272 N.W. 728 (1937); Muskegon Citizen's Loan &: Inv. Co. v.
Champayne, 257 Mich. 427, 241 N.W. 135 (1932). The purchaser is under no duty to
inquire as to possible defenses unless, from something appearing on the face of the
instrument or from something actually communicated to the purchaser, the failure to
investigate would amount to "bad faith." King v. C.B. Todd &: Sons, 310 Mich. 181, 16
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expect little help from the courts when he is sued by an assignee
of his contract or note and seeks to interpose, as a defense, claims
he has against the seller which have arisen out of the sale.
Even if the financial institution is denied holder status, however,
it may employ another cut-off device-the waiver-of-defense clause
-in an effort to preclude the consumer from asserting defenses.
Such clauses are inserted in retail-sales contracts and usually stipulate
that the buyer agrees not to assert any claims arising out of the sale
against any assignee of the contract. 81 The courts of some states have
recognized waiver-of-defense clauses as being an unfair imposition
upon a purchaser of consumer goods and have therefore held such
clauses to be contrary to public policy.82 In those states, the enforcement of the clauses has been denied. In most states, however, the
courts have upheld waiver-of-defense clauses as valid contractual provisions, cutting off the buyer's claims against an assignee of the
sales contract.83 The issue of the validity of waiver-of-defense clauses
has never been directly faced by the courts in Michigan; but since
the Michigan legislature has placed some limitations upon the use
of such clauses,84 there is reason to believe that the courts will not
trench upon legislative ground and extend the consumers' right any
further. Such a policy of judicial passiveness would be in keeping
N.W.2d 709 (1945); Muskegon Citizen's Loan & Inv. Co. v. Champayne, 257 Mich. 427,
2·U N.W. 135 (1932). The test is the subjective intent of the purchaser, and mere
negligence, or even gross negligence, in making the purchase will not be sufficient if
bad faith is not shown. King v. C.B. Todd & Sons, 310 Mich. 181, 16 N.W.2d 709
(1945); Hakes v. Thayer, 165 Mich. 476, 131 N.W. 174 (1911); Armstrong v. Stearns, 156
Mich. 597, 121 N.W. 312 (1909). Most of these cases were decided under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, the predecessor of the UCC provisions, as were most of the cases in
other jurisdictions. See cases cited in notes 71, 74-77 supra. The Michigan appellate
courts have not passed upon this issue since the adoption of the UCC in 1964, but
there is nothing in article III of the UCC that would appear to mandate a different
result. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 49-50, 53-60, 74-77 (1966); Note, Unico v. Owen:
Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course Under the U.C.C., 54 VA. L.
R.Ev. 279, 284-92 (1968). The validity of the "close-connection" test as a measure of
good faith or notice is similarly unresolved by the Michigan courts.
81. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. IOI, 107, 232 A.2d 405, 408 (1967), in which the
court stated that the purpose of a sales contract containing such a clause is to
get the most and give the least. Overall it includes a multitude of conditions,
stipulations, reservations, exceptions, and waivers skillfully devised to restrict the
liability of the seller within the narrowest limits, and to leave no avenue of
escape from liability on the part of the purchaser.
82. See, e.g., American Natl. Bank v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923);
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. IOI, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337
Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958). These decisions are consistent with UCC § 9-206(1).
That provision, while generally upholding the use of waiver clauses, stipulates that a
different rule may be established for consumer sales. The decisions are also consistent
with UCC § 2-302, which prohibits the enforcement of unconscionable clauses.
83. E.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580
(1956); National City Bank v. Prospect Syndicate, Inc., 170 Misc. 611, 10 N.Y.S.2d 759
(1939); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922).
8·1. See text accompanyin)? notes 92-95 infra.
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with the traditional reluctance of Michigan courts to take action -in
the consumer protection area.86
The harshness to the consumer of the holder-in-due-course doctrine or the waiver-of-defense clause has caused many state legislatures, including Michigan's, to restrict the use of those devices to
cut off the consumer's claims or defenses. Several states, through their
all-goods retail-sales statutes or through special legisltaion,86 have
withdrawn holder status from financial institutions in cases in which
the institutions purchase consumer paper. The Michigan Home Improvement Finance Act accomplishes essentially the same result by
providing that no negotiable instrument may be executed with a
home improvement contract. 87 The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,
however, contains no limitations upon the use of commercial paper in
automobile installment sales and thus leaves the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code unchanged. 88 The Retail Installment
Sales Act allows a negotiable note to be executed in conjunction with
an installment contract; but it provides that an assignment of the
note, even if made to an institution which qualifies as a holder in
due course, does not bar the buyer from raising a defense against
the institution unless a written notice of the assignment is mailed
to the buyer and he fails to notify the institution of a claim within
fifteen days. 89
There have been similar legislative responses with regard to
waiver-of-defense clauses, and almost all recent changes either prohibit90 or limit91 the use of such clauses. In Michigan, the Retail
Installment Sales Act prohibits waiver clauses entirely; 92 while under
the Home Improvement Finance Act such clauses are valid only if
the assignee notifies the buyer that there has been an assignment,
and receives no notice of any claims of the buyer within fifteen days
85. See text accompanying note 186 infra.
86. See Cal. Retail Installment Sales Act, CAL. C1v. CODE § 1803.2(a) (West Supp.
1970); Md. Retail Installment Sales Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1957); N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 403(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969); UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 2.403. See also Murphy, supra note 73, 673-74, 678-84 &: n.23.
87. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1207(1) (1967). If a promissory note is executed
to the dealer, it must contain a notice that it is subject to the terms of the executory
home improvement contract. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 445.1207 (1967).
88. See note 68 supra.
89. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.865(d) (1967).
90. Alas. Retail Installment Sales Act, ALAS. STAT. § 45.140 (1962); Conn. Home
Solicitation Sales Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-136 to -143 (Supp. 1968); Hawaii Retail
Installment Sales Act, HAWAII REv. LAWS § 201A-17(d) (Supp. 1967); see Murphy, supra
note 73, 678-84.
91. N.Y. Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. I.Aw § 403(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1969); Pa. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 (1965);
see UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404.
92. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.864(£) (1967).
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thereafter. 98 The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act also prohibits
waiver clauses,94 but stipulates that this provision does not affect
the rights of a holder in due course. 815
The Michigan statutory provisions relating to cut-off devices
contribute little to reducing the harsh effects of those devices upon
poor and uneducated consumers. Under all three acts, it is possible,
either through the use of the traditional holder-in-due-course doctrine
or through meeting a notice requirement, to deprive a buyer of his
defenses. The notice requirement, while in theory protecting an uneducated consumer against a cut-off of his defenses, does not seem
in practice to have that effect, since such consumers are not likely
to comprehend the significance of the notice from the finance company.116 Moreover, even if the consumer does understand that he must
notify the financial institution of his claims in order to preserve his
right of action, he may still not be protected, since in many cases
claims do not arise until after the fifteen-day statutory period for
giving notice of assignment. 07
In light of the weaknesses of the current statutory scheme, the
Michigan Attorney General and most poverty la'wyers feel that all
cut-off devices should be eliminated in consumer sales.98 The argumen.ts in support of this position are strong.09 Perhaps most significant
is the contention that the elimination of cut-off devices would bring
the reality of consumer transactions into line with consumer expectations, enabling consumers to exercise their most potent self-help
weapon-refusal to pay-against assignees of their obligations. In
addition, advocates of eliminating cut-off devices point out that the
policy of making commercial paper unconditionally transferable was
originally intended to facilitate negotiations among merchants for
whom freely transferable notes were an essential form of currency.100
This policy, the consumer advocates stress, does not justify the use
of cut-off devices in normal retail sales in which instruments are
93. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1206(a), .1208 (1967),
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.114(£) (1967).
95. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 492.114(£) (1967).
96. Murphy, supra note 67, at 320; Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 400; Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing,
1968 WIS. L, REv. 505, 521.
97. Some defenses, such as that of fraud, may well exist when the notice is received, But others, especially breach of warranty, may not arise until months, or even
years, after the time period for notification has elapsed.
98. Platsis Interview, supra note 44; Interview with Vincent Donnelly, Staff Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services, Detroit, Michigan, Aug. 21, 1969 [hereinafter
Donnelly Interview].
99. Murphy, supra note 73, at 674 n.24.
100. Littlefield, supra note 70; Murphy, supra note 73, at 672.
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rarely negotiated beyond the first assignment.101 Another argument
favoring the elimination of cut-off devices is that financial institutions
are better able to absorb the losses arising out of dealer misbehaviorby increasing credit rates, by expanding operations, or by purchasing
insurance-than are individual consumers. 102 Moreover, the argument runs, a small rise in the cost of credit would be justified by the
benefits resulting from the elimination of cut-off devices, particularly
since those increases would be distributed among a large number of
consumers, not only among the poor consumers most likely to be
victimized by dishonest merchants. A final argument is that since
much financing of consumer transactions is characterized by relatively close ties between the dealer and the financial institution,103
the institution is in a much better position than is the consumer,
and perhaps even the state, to control dealer practices.104 As a matter
of policy, therefore, it may be worthwhile to tap that source of
control by motivating financial institutions to become watchdogs of
consumer interests out of concern for the security of their mm investments.
As a practical matter, however, it must be recognized that not
all of the changes which will result from a prohibition of cut-off
devices will be favorable to the public-especially the poor consumer.
For example, an elimination of cut-off devices might motivate financial institutions to establish stricter security arrangements with
dealers in order to offset the increased risks of purchasing the dealers'
consumer paper without the protection of the cut-off devices.105 The
net effect of such a change would be to increase the dealers' cost
of doing business and thus to increase his prices to consumers. 106
101. A finance company, after purchasing consumer paper, may assign it to a bank
as security for a loan, but this paper is not freely negotiated between merchants as a
method of payment.
102. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New
UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272, 294 (1969).
103. Littlefield, supra note 70, at 63-64.
104. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 280-86; Murphy, supra note 67, at 320; Effective
Programs, supra note 16, at 417-18; see Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 S.2d 649 (Fla.
1953).
105. Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 418; Note, A Case Study of the Impact
of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period,
78 YALE L.J. 618, 640·41 (1969); see Vernon, Priorities, the UCC, and Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. IND. &: COM. L. R.Ev. 531, 547 (1964).
106. Some advocates of the use of cut-off devices have argued that an elimination
of such devices would probably motivate financial institutions to attempt to return
the risk of default to the dealer either through a dealer reserve fund or through an
agreement by which the dealer agrees to repurchase the assigned paper if it is defective. See note 105 supra. Such a change would clearly increase the dealers' cost of
doing business. In Michigan, however, that argument is inapposite since most Michigan
financial institutions purchasing consumer paper already use either reserve funds or
repurchase agreements. Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67; Interview with Professor
William J. Pierce, Executive Secretary, NCCUSL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Feb. 27, 1970.
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Moreover, while an elimination of cut-off devices might motivate
financial institutions to undertake more detailed investigations of
dealers, 107 such investigations would probably focus on the ability
of the merchant to meet its financial obligations-including, for example, any repurchase agreements-rather than on the merchant's
business ethics. 108 The financial institution would be primarily concerned with the risk involved in purchasing the dealer's commercial
paper; and the risk factor that is related to any particular transaction
is a matter of economics, not morality, especially when the seller
agrees to repurchase the paper or to reimburse the assignee if any
defects in the paper are uncovered. Although such investigations
would help to eradicate the problem of undercapitalized dealers
that are prone to become insolvent, the investigations would do little
to protect the consumer from a prosperous but dishonest merchant.109
Another possible institutional response to an elimination of cutoff devices-and perhaps an even more damaging one to low-income
consumers-is for financial institutions to discontinue their indirect
financing of consumer sales through the purchase of consumer paper,
and instead to place more emphasis upon making of direct loans to
consumers. 110 Retail dealers, particularly those regarded as poor risks
by the financial community, would then be faced with the alternatives of either financing their own installment sales or relying exclusively upon cash sales. 111 If dealers were to adopt the former
Nevertheless, increased costs to the dealer would still result if financial institutions,
because of a greater number of consumer suits or because of the fear of such suits,
were to require a larger percentage of the contract value or the value of a promissory
note executed in conjunction with the contract to be placed in the reserve fund. Of
course, if such increases in the amount of the reserve fund were not demanded of all
merchants, but only of those merchants who engage in dishonest practices and whose
paper is thus defective, then reputable merchants would not be hurt. If a repurchase
agreement is used, on the other hand, the entire cost of dishonest sales practices would
be shifted back to the merchant who committed those practices, unless the merchant
is financially unable to repurchase his defective paper. The financial institution could
protect itself against the possibility of insolvent dealers by accepting paper only from
l1ighly capitalized merchants. Unfortunately, however, this practice would not discriminate between smaller merchants who are honest and therefore present few risks
and merchants who use deceptive practices and thus present a high probability of
consumer suits. Tims some reputable small merchants would be forced to undertake
their own financing or else to go out of business. In the former case, consumers would
face increased prices, and in the latter, they would have fewer merchants with whom
to deal. See note ll0 infra.
107. Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination
of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 639 (1969).
108. Id.
109. See Murphy, supra note 67, at 280 n.29.
ll0. See Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 525; Note, A Case Study of the Impact of
Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period,
78 YALE L.J. 618, 642 (1969).
111. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 272-73, 292-93; Note, A Case Study of the Impact
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course and finance their own installment sales, the consequences to
the consumer would be increased prices or finance charges-particularly in ghetto areas-because the dealer would have to absorb
the losses resulting from uncollectible accounts and from other costs
of administering installment contracts, and because he would have to
do so without the expertise and loss-spreading capabilities of financial
institutions. In addition, there would be greater likelihood of dealer
insolvency. 112
Because of the demands upon capital which are imposed by installment financing, however, it is probable that few merchants would
be able to afford to make installment sales unless they had the
opportunity to sell their commercial paper to institutional purchasers.113 Thus most retail dealers would turn to a greater use of
cash sales, thereby increasing the incidence of direct lending from
banks and finance companies to consumers. For poor consumers,
this shift would probably lead to a decreased ability to purchase
goods because of their general inability to obtain credit other than
from retailers catering to low-income buyers.114 But even if such
consumers were able to obtain loans, they would lose the benefits of
the elimination of cut-off devices, since the loan from the bank or
finance company would not be tied to any purchase; the buyer would
be required to repay the loan even if he was defrauded by a dealer.
Furthermore, many poverty lawyers are fearful that increased reliance by dealers upon cash sales, coupled with more direct lending by
financial institutions, would result in the development of a "referral"
system whereby the lender accepts customers referred to him by the
dealer. 115 Under such a scheme, both the dealer and the lender would
of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off
Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 642-46 (1969).
112. Even large department stores, which regularly finance all installment sales
themselves, report that their credit operations produce a net loss. But the ratio of the
loss to gross credit sales increases as the size of the store decreases. NATIONAL RETAIL
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPARTMENT STORE CREDIT 51-52
(1969). Small, low-income retailers who operate closer to the legal limit on interest

MERCHANTS AssN.,

charges and depend much more on installment sales than do large retailers would be
less able to undertake financing operations themselves. Any increased costs would,
of course, be passed on to the consumer, probably in the form of higher prices. See
FTC CREDIT STUDY, supra note 5, at 5, 26-27. Also, the smaller merchants, in order to
maintain a flow of capital, would either have to take out loans themselves, which
might not be feasible, or to reduce the time period for payment on installment sales
from several years to several months. Either way the poor consumer is harmed.
113. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 274; Note, supra note 104, at 644-45.
114. See notes 63, 106 supra. This inability to obtain credit may not be an entirely
undesirable consequence, since many poor consumers do purchase items that they do
not need or cannot afford. Unfortunately, however, this restriction also prevents the
poor from purchasing goods that are useful or necessary.
115. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 272-73, 292-93; Murphy, Another "Assault Upon
the Citadel"-Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver of Defense Clauses
in Consumer Sales, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 667, 687 (1968). See also Note, supra note 10-!, at

645.
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profit at the buyer's expense-the dealer by obtaining a cash sale
and the lender by obtaining an absolute obligation on the part of
the buyer to repay the loan. 116
The problem of deciding what to do about cut-off devices is
compounded by the lack of empirical data demonstrating the actual
costs and benefits that will result from any given course of action.
A careful analysis of the pros and cons of cut-off devices from the
standpoint of the consumer, however, suggests that elimination of
those devices should be favored because of the likelihood that the
benefits of elimination will outweigh the disadvantages. 117 After an
initial period of overreaction in the finance industry, the added risks
of financing without the benefit of cut-off devices would probably be
spread among the various parties involved in consumer sales and in
consumer finance, and the extreme burden previously placed upon
the defrauded consumer whose obligation is purchased by a financial
institution would be removed. It also seems reasonable to assume
that, without cut-off devices, dealers experiencing a high percentage
of complaints from buyers would find it more difficult and more
expensive to sell commercial paper to financial institutions and would
find it more costly to remain in business,118 Eliminating cut-off devices therefore may tend to weed out at least the most blatant perpetrators of fraud in the market place. If referral schemes between
merchants and lenders become a serious problem, that problem can
be dealt with either by new legislation119 or by an extension of the
"single transaction" doctrine which denies holder-in-due-course status
to financial institutions when the institution and the merchant have
a "close connection."120 On balance, then, a complete elimination of
cut-off devices seems desirable. That elimination could be best accomplished through an all-inclusive deceptive-practices statute,121
116. The loan, under current theory at least, would not be conditional even if the
merchant accompanied the consumer to the finance company, and the company approved. There is also the possibility that an increase in the ri~k of sales to low-income
consumers would exert pressure on dealers to obtain greater sales volume and could
lead to an increase in the use of fraudulent or high-pressure sales tactics.
117. In at least one state, New Mexico, there is evidence that elimination of cut-off
devices has not made any appreciable difference in the ability of low-income consumers
to purchase on credit. See Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer
Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. REv. 535, 551-52 (1967). With a rational
allocation of risks, the result of the elimination of cut-off devices should be the same
in Michigan. See also Note, supra note 105, at 655-56; Comment, Consumer Protection
-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 525.
118. See Note, supra note 104, at 645-50.
119. For a suggested solution, see Littlefield, supra note 102, at 293-96.
120. See Littlefield, supra note 102, at 286-97; text accompanying notes 71-78 supra.
121. Section 9 of the CSG act, supra note 40, contains a provision which eliminates
all cut-off devices in consumer sales. In addition, the act allows a consumer to maintain an affirmative action against the assignee; although the consumer cannot recover
an amount greater than the amount owed to the assignee, he is not limited to a simple
set-off. This provision gives the consumer a way to avoid harassment or loss of credit

946

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:926

rather than through limited-purpose acts such as those that are in
effect to some degree in Michigan.122 A comprehensive provision
would eliminate gaps in coverage and would contribute to the development of an integrated statutory framework to deal with consumer fraud problems.
Apart from the regulation of cut-off devices, the statutes of many
states contain provisions that afford a consumer the opportunity to
rescind a sales contract during a designated period of time after the
contract is executed.123 In Michigan, only one statute contains such
a "cooling-off" provision-the Home Improvement Finance Act.124
That statute allows a buyer, for any reason, to rescind a home improvement sales contract if written notice is given to the seller at his
place of business, or is mailed to him by certified letter, by 5:00 p.m.
of the next business day following the execution of the contract.125
Notice of the right to rescind must be printed in eight-point type
on the home improvement contract.126
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code127 and the laws
of several states128 contain provisions calling for a cooling-off period.120 Most of these statutes apply to all sales made through home
solicitations;130 but the Michigan statute, which is not limited to
rating while waiting for the assignee to sue. In Michigan, where consumer sales arc
presently covered by three major acts, the adoption of a comprehensive deceptivepractices statu_te would reduce the complexity of handling consumer cases.
122. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
123. See Iu.. .ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, §§ 261-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970) (covers
goods and services sold at the buyer's home); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 14
(Supp. 1969) (covers installment sales of any goods and services if such sales are ex•
ecuted somewhere other than the seller's place of business); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454
(Supp. 1969) (covers goods and services sold anywhere).
124. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445, 1101 (1967).
125. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1202(c)(4) (1967).
126. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.I202(b)(4) (1967). Statutes such as this one will
be effective only if consumers know that they have a right of rescission and are able to
exercise that right effectively. This is especially critical since in most cases the right
must be exercised within a short time after the execution of the contract. The requirement that notice be displayed in eight-point type will increase utilization of the
statute, but will not itself always adequately inform the low-income consumer. A
better approach would be to require that the seller provide the buyer with a separate
notice of the right to rescind and a separate form for exercising the right, such as a
post card. See Project, The Direct Selling lndustry: An Empirical Study, 16 UCLA
L. REv. 890, 1014 (1969).
127. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.502(1)-(3), 2.503(2) (Proposed Draft,
1969).
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-134 to .139 (Supp. 1969); !LL• .ANN. STAT. ch. 121½,
§§ 261-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS .ANN. ch. 255D, § 14 (Supp.
1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-203 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454
(Supp. 1969).
129. See note 123 supra.
130. See, e.g., Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, §§ 261-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); l\lAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255D, § 14 (Supp. 1969); WASH. LAWS. ch. 234 WASH. REv. CODE
§ 63.14.154 (Supp. 1969).
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home solicitations, covers only home improvement contracts.131 The
Michigan Act therefore offers little benefit to the large percentage
of inner-city residents who do not mm their own homes.
There has been some controversy among commentators concerning the value to the consumer of cooling-off provisions.132 One
recent study, for example, concluded that a cooling-off provision in
the Connecticut Home Solicitations Sales Act benefited the consumer
very little. 133 The study showed that most consumers did not reconsider a contract until after the goods were received or the services
performed, which was usually long after the cooling-off period had
ended. Yet if the statutory cooling-off period did significantly extend
the length of time within which the buyer could rescind-such as
providing for a period extending to the time of the seller's first
performance on the contract-then, at least according to the businessmen, retail sales and the financing process would be intolerably
burdened. 134
Despite the doubts expressed both by advocates of consumer interests and by businessmen concerning the efficacy of various types of
cooling-off provisions, the idea of providing the buyer with a right of
rescission under appropriate circumstances is probably a sound one. 135
131. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.1202{c), .1203{l) {1967).
132. See Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 421-22, in which it is argued that
there are many consumers who would like to rescind but cannot. No evidence is
offered, however, to show that if a statute allowed consumers to rescind, the con•
sumers would utilize the statute.
133. Note, supra note 104, at 628-30. The only difference between the Michigan
and Connecticut statutes is the requirement in Michigan that the contract contain a
notice of the right to rescind. The Connecticut statute did not have such a requirement, but this absence probably did not cause the lack of effectiveness of the Connecticut cooling-off provision. Lawyers for the poor indicate that cooling-off provisions do
little to aid the poor, because poor people generally do not own homes, because the
poor are seldom aware of the right to rescind even if that right does exist, and because,
even when the poor are aware of such a provision, they are seldom able to utilize it.
Donnelly Interview, supra note 98.
134. Note, supra note 104, at 628-30. Opposition to cooling-off statutes is found
primarily among reputable merchants. Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Em•
pirical Study, 16 UCLA L. REv. 890, 1008-09 {1969). Such merchants feel that a
statute eliminating cut-offs would harm them and would not affect the fly-by-night
sellers who presumably present the most difficulties. Id. at 1009.
135. There is danger that emphasis on the availability of a cooling-off provision
will obscure other rights of the purchaser. For example, the agreement which a consumer signs at his home is usually an offer by the buyer, not a binding contract. The
buyer becomes bound only when acceptance is made at the seller's home office and
until that time the buyer has the right to withdraw his offer. G. GRISMORE, CoNTRAcrs
§ 32 {rev. ed. 1965). The consumer will probably feel, however, that he has only the
cooling-off period in which to rescind when in fact he may be able to revoke his offer
for a much longer period. Most consumers do not even realize they are signing only
an offer and that they have a right to revoke until an acceptance is received. The
solution to this problem seems to be increased education of consumers regarding
their legal rights or perhaps a requirement that salesmen inform consumers of the
significance of the document they are signing. In addition, the cooling-off period could
be made longer in order to reflect more accurately the normal time which sellers take
to accept offers.
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For example, a statute allowing rescission, within a reasonable time,
of all sales of goods and services under an installment credit contract solicited at the consumer's home would be of value to the
consumer and would not place an extreme burden on retail dealers136
or financial institutions. A reasonable time period, coupled with clear
notice on the face of the installment contract that the buyer had
the right to rescind, 137 would afford the consumer the opportunity
to re-evaluate his purchase out of the presence of the salesman and
to check over the contract to ensure that it accurately reflects his conception of the oral agreement he has consummated. The dealer could
protect himself by postponing performance on the contract until
the buyer has waived his right of rescission or until the period for
rescission has run. Alternatively, the statute could protect dealers
through the inclusion of a provision requiring the buyer to pay a
small percentage of the purchase price for each day between the
execution of the contract and rescission, 138 with the percentage increasing in proportion to the time elapsed. Combined with an effective consumer education and credit counseling program, a statute
granting the consumer a right of rescission would operate as a check
on at least the most blatant dealer malpractices and would encourage
more rational purchasing on the part of consumers.
Before leaving the discussion of consumer protection legislation,
it is worthwhile to consider a recent attempt in Michigan to combat
deceptive advertising. In 1966 the Michigan legislature enacted a
new false-advertising statute which provides for civil remedies against
violators.139 The act, which reflects the current trend away from
reliance upon criminal statutes to protect the consumer, 140 prohibits
anyone from "knowingly" placing ·before the public any untrue,
deceptive, or misleading statement,141 and from publishing an advertisement either with the intent not to sell at the price stated
therein or with the intent not to sell the goods or services that were
advertised. 142 Pursuant to the act's remedial provisions, the Attorney
136. Indeed, many reputable businesses, especially large department stores, offer
liberal rescission privileges even when there is no statute requiring them to do so.
Thus, it can be argued that an extension of the right to rescission to all consumer
sales would have a substantial effect on only those merchants dealing largely with lowincome consumers.
137. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1202(c)(4) (1967).
138. There is a clause of this sort in at least one state statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, § 500-206(£) (Supp. 1969). See also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1202 (1967).
139. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.801-.809 (1967).
140. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. REv. 559, 584-85 (1968).
141. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.801 (1967),
142. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.805 (1967). This section prohibits so-called "bait"
advertising, which occurs when an advertisement for one article is used as an inducement for the sale of higher-priced goods.
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General may ask for an injunction against the continuation of a
violation, 143 but such a request may be granted only after the defendant has been given forty-eight hours to cease violating the
statute.144 In the event an injunction is obtained, a subsequent violation of it subjects the merchant to a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars.145 The Attorney General may also accept an assurance of discontinuance from a person allegedly in violation of the
act. 146 This assurance, which does not constitute an admission of
any fact or issue at law, must be filed with the clerk of an appropriate
circuit court. 147 The act says nothing about any sanction for violating
the terms of an assurance. 148
The new statute has several basic weaknesses, First, the requirement that the dealer be notified forty-eight hours in advance of any
attempted injunction and that he be given the opportunity in all
cases, to desist voluntarily, compels the Attorney General to deal
with flagrant or frequent violators in the same way that he deals with
first offenders. Although it seems fair to give first offenders the chance
to desist voluntarily, the same is not true of frequent violators since
they have shown that their voluntary compliance is not made in
good faith. 140 In addition, the fine is in reality meaningless; it is not
severe enough to act as a deterrent and can easily be absorbed as
a cost of doing business by all but the smallest dealers. Finally,
injunctive relief by itself provides only prospective relief; it does
nothing to rectify the economic injury already suffered by those
who have been defrauded by the deceptive advertising. It is difficult
to assess the effectiveness of this act in practical terms, since it has
been "invoked" only once in the three years of its existence. 150 But
for the reasons suggested, it does not appear to be a particufarly
143. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.807(1) (1967).
144. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN,§ 445.807(2) (1967).
145. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.808 (1967).
146. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.809 (1967).
147. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 445.809 (1967).
148. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.808 (1967) provides a penalty for violation only
of an order or injunction issued pursuant to the act. Although the assurance must be
filed with the court, no order is issued, and thus the assurance does not come within
the scope of § 445.808. The question is open whether a violation of an assurance
allows the Attorney General to ask for an injunction without again giving the merchant
notice and an opportunity to cease the prohibited conduct.
149. With regard to frequent violators, the Attorney General perhaps should be
given authority to take direct action without giving the violator an opportunity to
desist. Such a provision would allow a full range of contempt sanctions to be applied
against the dealer who has demonstrated bad faith and would prohibit him from
playing cat and mouse with the Attorney General by a cunning use of voluntary agreements to desist.
150. In that case, an assurance was obtained during the Christmas season from a
Detroit jeweler who agreed not to continue advertising used watches as new. No other
action was taken and no relief was given to defrauded customers, although a few
settlements were obtained. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E, at I, col. I.
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potent weapon against deceptive advertisers; and unless it is used
more frequently, it can obviously have little impact in the consumer
protection area.
The sad truth about the entire Michigan statutory scheme is that
this new false-advertising statute is the only real weapon with which
the Attorney General can wage the war against consumer fraud. His
authority to ask for injunctions under either the Retail Installment
Sales Act or the Home Improvement Sales Finance Act is essentially
meaningless, since violations of those statutes are seldom prosecuted
and are rarely repeated. 151 In summary, Michigan's Attorney General
is given inadequate power and resources to deal with the limited
problems of false advertising and illegal credit arrangements-and no
power at all to deal with other types of fraudulent and deceptive
practices in the market place.

II. THE

ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY

The five principal agencies charged with enforcing the criminal
and civil consumer protection statutes in Michigan are the local
police and prosecutors,152 the Secretary of State, the Financial Institutions Bureau of the Department of Commerce,153 the Attorney General,154 and the Bureau of Consumer Protection in the Department
of Agriculture.155
A. The Prosecuting Attorney and the Police Department

Since the most pressing consumer fraud problems in the State of
Michigan are related to the exploitation of low-income consumers
in t:ne city of Detroit,156 it is worthwhile to consider what enforcement agencies are available to consumers in the Detroit area. The
151. There have been only two prosecutions under each act since they were enacted,
and no injunctions have been issued. Nolan Interview, supra note 18; see text accompanying notes 189-90 infra.
152. See text accompanying notes 157-200 infra.
153. See text accompanying notes 201-64 infra.
154. See text accompanying notes 265-78 infra.
155. This Bureau has regulatory power with respect to the quality of goods and
drugs, and it deals with deceptive practices only as they relate to this primary function.
The Bureau of Consumer Protection is not concerned with installment sales. As a
resnlt, the Bureau is not in the mainstream of consumer protection activity. Nevertheless, the Bureau does have a great deal of expertise in matters relating to public
health, and it performs important services in that area. Thus the Bureau should retain
jurisdiction over the narrow area of deceptive practices that are within the ambit of
public-health matters. This does not mean that the administrator of state deceptivepractice legislation cannot take cognizance of deceptive acts also regulated by the
Department of ,Agriculture, for the nature of the product should not leave a merchant
immune from the greater variety of sanctions and remedies available to the administrator.
156. See note 12 supra.
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most obvious of those agencies are the Wayne County prosecutor
and the Detroit police department. Hence, it is important to evaluate
the effectiveness of those agencies in enforcing the criminal laws of
the state in order to prevent or punish fraudulent conduct and in
order to secure relief for defrauded consumers.
The Wayne County prosecutor has established a Fraud and Special Services Section (Fraud Section) to hear, and act directly upon,
complaints from consumers. The Fraud Section is headed by an
assistant prosecutor, and he is aided by two other assistant prosecutors
who work only on consumer fraud problems, and by one investigator.
Consumer fraud, however, is not the only area supervised by the
Fraud Section; 157 cases involving embezzlement, larceny by conversion, improper use of credit cards, violations of the state employment
and wage laws, and illegal receipt or withholding of welfare allo-wances are handled as well. 158 In fact, of 239 warrants processed by the
fraud section from May to August 1969, only twelve were for offenses
that could be classified as fraudulent business practices; and· most of
those warrants involved fraudulent practices that were not related to
consumer transactions. 11i9 Nevertheless, the bulk of the actual, working time of the members of the fraud section is devoted to hearing
and acting upon consumer complaints, since all other types of offenses
are first investigated by the Fraud Division of the police department,
and since the function of the prosecutor's Fraud Section in those
cases is usually limited to the decision whether or not to issue a
warrant. 160
The Fraud Division of the police department is located in the
same building as the prosecutor's Fraud Section, and until recently
all consumer complaints were handled initially by the police.161 Although the prosecutor now hears some consumer complaints directly,
the majority of the complaints received by the Fraud Section are still
processed first by the police Fraud Division.162 Under the customary
procedure, therefore, the Fraud Section does not see a complaint unless a warrant recommendation is submitted by the detective investigating the case. This screening process would present no difficulties
if the police and prosecutor had the same philosophy with regard to
the enforcement of the legislation prohibiting fraud in the market
157. ,vhen not prosecuting fraudulent merchants, the assistant prosecutor may
well be processing charges resulting from bar room brawls or a vice raid on a brothel.
158. FRAUD AND SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION, WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, REPORT ON ,vARRANT RECOMMENDATIONS, May-August 1969.
159. Id.; Nolan Interview, supra note 18. A clerk who submitted false vouchers for
payment by his employer would be prosecuted under the same statute as a merchant
making false representations to a consumer in order to induce a sale.
160. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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place, and if both had the same ability to judge the legal sufficiency
of a complaint. But unlike the prosecutor's Fraud Section, which
favors increased use of criminal sanctions against dishonest merchants,163 the police officials in the Fraud Division regard themselves
as little more than a mediation service.164 Hence, although the police
have been quite successful at persuading businessmen to make restitution to complaining consumers, 165 they have done little to help the
vast majority of defrauded consumers who do not seek governmental
assistance.166 Furthermore, very few of the cases in which the police
Fraud Division has decided to seek warrants involve ordinary fraudulent business practices; rather, most of the warrants have been issued
against perpetrators of unusual fraudulent schemes unrelated to normal consumer transactions.167 Even the cases that have involved "normal" consumer fraud have not always been properly disposed of;
many cases have been dropped by the Fraud Division on the ground
that the acts complained of did not constitute a criminal violation, although in fact a case could have been made out under one of the statutes less commonly used in consumer fraud cases. 168 In fairness to the
police department, however, it must be noted that the Fraud Division
has only one detective with legal training and that it suffers from a
severe manpower shortage since only four detectives are assigned to
the broad category of fraud work.169 Those four men are responsible
for approximately 1,200 investigations per month in the general area
of frauds, 170 and those investigations give rise to between twenty-four
and seventy-one warrants per month. 171 Moreover, these figures do not
include the "mediation services," which account for the settlement of
a vast majority of the three hundred or more consumer fraud complaints received annually.172 Finally, the Fraud Division's emphasis on
mediation rather than on prosecution is not unpopular among ag163. Id.
164. Id. Interview with Edward V. Boggs, Lieutenant, Fraud Division, Detroit Police
Department, Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 2, 1969 [hereinafter Boggs Interview].
165. Id.
166. The assistant prosecutor in charge of the Fraud and Special Services Section
estimates that 98 to 99% of consumers who are defrauded do not seek his help. Nolan
Interview, supra note 18; see text accompanying notes 276-93 infra. Obviously, mediation does not solve the essential problems of stopping the deceptive practices and
deterring violators from future deceptive conduct. Mediation alone may even be harmful, since it reduces the desire of the victim to seek other governmental action.
167. Boggs Interview, supra note 164.
168. For example, restitution was obtained from a retailer selling prepaid television
repair contracts, when it was determined that this type of activity was arguably
covered by insurance regulation laws. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
169. This category includes the enforcement, inter alia, of blue-sky laws, confidence
schemes, and credit card and check forgery cases. Boggs Interview, supra note 164.
170. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION MONTHLY WORK REPORT, July-Sept. 1959.
171. Id.
172. Boggs Interview, supra note 164.
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grieved consumers. Complainants are not particularly interested in
prosecution of unscrupulous merchants; rather they are interested in
the quickest and most effective way of getting their money backand that way is most often through the mediation services.173 But regardless of whether the police department has been somehow culpable
for the lack of concerted action against fraudulent merchants-and
there are sound reasons to believe that it has not-the fact remains
that the Fraud Division has not been a potent force in the fight
against consumer fraud.
The increased activity of the prosecutor in the consumer fraud
area is at least in part a response to the lack of effective police action.
Although the police Fraud Division still initially handles the bulk
of routine consumer fraud matters, the prosecutor's Fraud Section
has attempted to open direct lines of communication between its
office and defrauded consumers. 174 This method of operation is apparently neither unique nor particularly common among prosecutors
in major urban areas. 175 The motives underlying direct action by
173. Any changes giving greater authority to law-enforcement officials are not, of
course, designed to eliminate or even reduce mediation efforts. For many consumers
mediation will always remain the most efficient way to obtain restitution, especially
in small-claims cases. What is desired is a system which provides the consumer with
his remedy, but at the same time docs not discourage the prosecution of, or other
action against, fraudulent merchants.
174. The assistant prosecutor has requested various individuals and groups concerned with the problems of low-income consumers-particularly Neighborhood Legal
Services, urban clinics, and local consumers' councils-to inform him of the fraudulent
practices currently being used in the inner city. He also has met with consumer groups
both to solicit complaints and to exchange ideas concerning the most effective strategy
for combatting fraud. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
175. The Michigan Law Review sent inquiries to prosecutors or district attorneys
in thirty-two major cities; fifteen prosecutorial offices sent replies outlining their consumer protection activities. Five (Baltimore, St. Louis, Phoenix, Newark, and Denver)
reported that they performed no consumer protection functions of any consequence
unless a clear criminal violation of a substantial nature was involved, and that all
cases-the great majority-were sent to the attorney general or to some other state
official. In four of these states there is reasonably strong deceptive practice legislation.
On the other hand, in cities located in states that have not enacted strong deceptive
practices legislation, the pattern is similar to that found in Detroit: the prosecutor does
what he can with only ill-suited criminal laws to use as leverage, and much mediation
is performed with few actual prosecutions. Usually the police perform the investigative
work, but one prosecutor (in Portland, Oregon) found the same problems with that
system as did the prosecutor in Detroit; and he solved it in the same manner, soliciting
his own complaints and dealing directly with the public. The remaining six prosecutorial offices (Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, and Manhattan in New York, and San Francisco
and Los Angeles in California) are aided by fraud bureaus in the attorney general's
office, but there is no comprehensive state statute giving a full range of remedies. In
all six of these areas, consumers make complaints directly to the district attorney's
office; investigation is then conducted by the police assigned to that office. New York
City also has established a strong department of consumer affairs; and it has a homerule consumer protection act, but the prosecutor plays no part in the enforcement of
that act. In the cities, in which the prosecutor has authority to enforce an injunction
statute, especially in San Francisco and Los Angeles, consumer protection activity is
marked by a spirit of cooperation between the state and local agencies. The probable
result is that there is more protection in those cities than there is in cities with no
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the prosecutor are to provide more vigorous action against businessmen operating in a fraudulent manner, to aid the vast majority of
defrauded consumers who do not complain to the police, and to discover as early as possible the appearance of dishonest merchants who
are not yet listed in police records.176 During the past several months
the Fraud Section has received between 200 and 300 complaints referred from Neighborhood Legal Services,177 private attorneys,178 the
Urban Clinic of the University of Detroit Law School,179 and individuals in the community who have learned about the prosecutor's
activities. 180 Leaders of indigenous consumer groups in the inner city
have reported confidence in the Fraud Section,181 and that confidence
may justify vesting concurrent jurisdiction in the Attorney General
and the prosecutor when, and if, a broad deceptive-practices statute
is enacted in Michigan. 1s2
The Fraud Section has obtained some favorable results in the
fight against fraudulent merchants, but it has not done so without
difficulty. The main problems confronting the Fraud Section are lack
of manpower, attempts by defendants or potential defendants to
undercut prosecutions by settling with the victim,183 and judicial
insensitivity to the serious nature of fraudulent business practices.
Prosecutions for various types of fraud often require considerable
investigative work, mainly in the form of obtaining circumstantial
state action, and perhaps more than there is in cities in which there is a strong state
provision but listless enforcement. However, in those six areas, the coordination between the agencies involved is not as great as would exist if one official possessed
plenary power in this area, and there are probably wasted resources. If nothing else,
Detroit should assign Detroit city police to the prosecutor's office in order to aid the
prosecutor in making investigations. See text accompanying note 185 infra.
176. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
177. This source of complaints seems to be particularly promising. See FTC PRO•
TECTION PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 4.
178. In one case, an attorney for a finance company who defended several merchants

filed a complaint that his daughter had been defrauded, and the prosecutor promptly
obtained restitution. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
179. The Urban Clinic is a legal-aid society staffed by students from the University
of Detroit Law School.
180. Leaders of consumer groups have reported that the reputation of the prosecutor's office is spreading in the inner city, and that consumers now take complaints
directly to the Fraud Section, bypassing other agencies such as the police or the Better
Business Bureau. Interview with Consumers' Research Advisory Council, Detroit,
Michigan, Aug. 21, 1969.
181. Interview, supra note 180.
182. It should be noted that the trend in the model legislation is to vest sole
authority in the attorney general. See text accompanying notes 291-92 infra. If con•
current jurisdiction were granted to both the prosecutor and the attorney general,
the attorney general would still have plenary power over all actions, but the local
prosecutors could also act after notifying the attorney general and affording him the
opportunity to intervene. See N.M. STAT, ANN. § 49-15-13 (Supp. 1969).
183. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
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evidence to show fraudulent intent; 184 but the prosecutor has only
one investigator. Moreover, the prosecutor, as a county official, does
not have authority over the Detroit police department and thus cannot utilize its services for his investigative work. 185 Even when the
Fraud Section is able to obtain the necessary information to go to
court, and the victim is willing to testify, there remains the problem
that the judges in the Recorder's Court apparently do not believe
that defrauding poor people is a serious offense.186 Perhaps this seeming incredulity can be explained by the fact that the judge in a given
case sees only one violation by the defendant unless that defendant
has been convicted previously, and thus does not generally realize
the history of fraudulent dealings in which the defendant may have
engaged.187 In addition, neither judge nor jury is very willing to
send a businessman to jail. But whatever the reason for the hesitancy
on the part of courts to apply criminal sanctions to dishonest merchants, it seems clear that the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution
is not enhanced when a suspended sentence is given to a dealer with
several hundred complaints against him. Apart from the problem of
judicial sympathy to members of the business community, the prosecutor faces pressure from judges who feel that he is wasting the
court's time and the taxpayers' money by prosecuting such petty
crimes as consumer fraud when muggers and rapists roam the
streets.188 Despite these difficulties, the prosecutor's fraud section has
obtained several convictions, including two for violation of the Retail Installment Sales Act189 and two for violation of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. 100 Those convictions arose out of the first
prosecutions in the history of both statutes.191
The Fraud Section has achieved its limited successes by using, or
threatening to use, the extreme sanction of a criminal action. As a
result of the increased vitality of the Fraud Section in the consumer
fraud area, and as a result of the assistant prosecutor's willingness to
184. Id.
185. Detroit could increase the usefulness of the prosecutor's Fraud Section by
assigning skilled police officers to that office, as is presently done in several major
cities. See note 171 supra. Alternatively, the Section could be authorized more than one
investigator of its own choice.
186. This conclusion was derived from a series of interviews with individuals in•
volved in consumer protection activities. The consensus was that Recorder's Court
judges simply do not view "white collar" offenses as real crimes deserving the imposition of sc,•ere penalties. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra
note 18.
187. This fact illustrates another advantage of using injunctions or other civil
proceedings: evidence of a merchant's past business practices may be presented to the
judge. Sre notes 317-23 infra and accompanying text.
188. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
189. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.856 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
190. MICH, CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.137 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
191. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
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go to court, the Better Business Bureau and related groups, such as
Neighborhood Legal Services, have been able to use the mere threat
of invoking the assistance of the Fraud Section to obtain settlements
on behalf of defrauded consumers and in some cases even to effectuate
a change in business practices.192 Thus, for example, although there
have been only four prosecutions for violations of legislation prohibiting a dealer from using blank contracts in the sale of automobiles193 or other consumer goods,194 reports from consumer groups
and legal services indicate that the use of blank contracts has significantly decreased since the assistant prosecutor's consumer protection campaign began.195 However, outside the area in which
legislation precisely defines the prohibited conduct, thus enabling
potential offenders easily to compare their business practices with
conduct that is being prosecuted, the deterrent effect of criminal
prosecutions is substantially reduced. The prosecutor admits, for
instance, that he is able successfully to attack false and deceptive
advertising only upon a case-by-case basis.196 A deceptive advertiser
may reform his practices when he is directly confronted with a threat
of prosecution, but the fact that another dealer is being prosecuted
for an advertisement that bears little resemblance to his own seldom
deters him from engaging in such practices. Perhaps this situation is
as it should be. Giving a law-enforcement official the unfettered ability to use threats of prosecution in order to control the dissemination of
business information would certainly raise grave constitutional questions about the chilling effect of that power upon free speech.191
Moreover, such power could tend to stifle experimentation and
originality in the marketing of consumer goods.
In essence, the argument against making the prosecutor and the
criminal law the primary weapons in the fight against the perpetrators
of consumer fraud is not that criminal sanctions are inappropriate
for the offenses commonly committed; indeed, in certain cases harsh
treatment may not only be warranted,198 but may be uniquely effec192. Donnelly Interview, supra note 98; Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
193. MicH. Cm,1p. LAws ANN. § 492.112 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
194. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.856 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18,
195. One automobile dealer now keeps all of his blank installment sales contracts
in a safe to ensure that none is ever used without his supervision. Donnelly Interview,
supra note 98.
196. Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
197. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
198. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct.
1966). The pyramid franchising operations of the defendant in this case were so blatant
and involved so many innocent consumers in unconscionable transactions that the
judge recommended to the prosecutor that criminal prosecution be initiated for a wide
variety of offenses. The culpability of the perpetrators was felt to be so great that even
a permanent injunction and business dissolution was not considered a severe enough
sanction or deterrent.
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tive as well. In the great majority of cases, however, criminal convictions are difficult to obtain and are likely to result in relatively light
sentences.199 Furthermore, law-enforcement activity generally results
in restriction for only the small number of victimized consumers
who are involved in mediation,200 and it may result in only a temporary and sporadic halt in deceptive practices. .AJ; mentioned previously, one possible solution to this problem is to make the prosecutor a co-enforcer, with the Attorney General, of a comprehensive
deceptive-practices statute. But until such a statute is enacted, the
prosecutor will be forced to continue his bludgeon tactics without
much hope of making a substantial dent in the volume of fraudulent
business practices plaguing the inner city. The problem in Detroit
is not lack of concern or initiative on the part of the prosecutor;
rather, the problem is that the tools of enforcement with which he
is provided to combat consumer fraud are simply unsuited to the
task.

B. Licensing Statutes
All automobile dealers in Michigan must be licensed under the
Motor Vehicle Code,201 and the Secretary of State is empowered by
the Code to issue such licenses.202 In addition, automobile dealers
who sell on an installment basis-and the financial institutions taking assignments of such contracts-must also be licensed under the
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act; 203 and the Act vests authority to
grant such licenses in the Financial Institutions Bureau204 whose primary responsibility is to ensure the financial integrity of lending
institutions, including automobile dealers who finance their own
installment sales.206 The latter Act is the only licensing provision in
Michigan applicable to retail dealers offering installment sales to the
public.
Both statutes impose a general requirement of character and fitness upon the applicants for those licenses.200 If an applicant is rejected either by the Secretary or by the Bureau, he may appeal the
decision to the state's circuit court.207 Both agencies may also revoke
a license if the dealer holding it is found to have engaged in fraudu199. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra note 18; see Effective
Programs, supra note 16, at 426-27.
200. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
201. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.248-.250 (1967).
202. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(a) (1967).
203. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.103 {1967).
204. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 492.103(1) (1967).
205. Tricrweiler Interview, supra note 67.
206. MICH. COIIIP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.248(b), 492.108(a) (1967).
207. MICH. COIIIP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.250(b), 492.I0B(b} (1967).

958

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:926

lent activities. 208 Again, appeals from a decision revoking a license
may be taken to the circuit court. 200 Of course, withdrawal of a license by the Financial Institutions Bureau pursuant to the provisions
of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act prohibits only the installment
sales of vehicles; and consequently cash sales may continue until the
Secretary of State acts, after a formal hearing, to remove the seller's
general dealer's license. Indeed, the Financial Institutions Bureau is
concerned with automobile dealers only insofar as they act as lending .
institutions, and it regulates them only with regard to their financial
affairs. 210
Ideally, the licensing provisions of both acts must be used either
to prevent probable defrauders from obtaining a license or to remove a license from a dealer who is operating in a fraudulent manner.211 In practice, however, the licensing acts have not been used
for those purposes; 212 and as a result, the consumer benefits little
from their existence.
There are several reasons for the ineffectiveness of the licensing
statutes. First, the state does not have enough information about applicants to prevent dishonest merchants from receiving a license.
Both the Motor Vehicle Code and the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act require an applicant for a license to submit a detailed form. If
the dealer is a corporation, the form must include the names and
addresses of all directors and the name and address of some individual
who has power of attorney to receive process.213 The Motor Vehicle
Code also requires a statement of the previous history of the applicant "sufficient to establish . . . [his] reputation and character in
business," 214 and a statement disclosing any previous license applica208. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 257.249(d), 492.I09(a)(9) (1967).
209. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 257.250(b), 492.109(d) (1967).
210. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.110 (1967) permits the Financial Institutions
Bureau to examine the books and records of a licensee and to subpoena witnesses or
documents. Essentially the field investigators seek to determine whether the dealer is
using sound methods of record-keeping and accounting, whether he charges proper
credit rates, and whether he has exceeded the legal limit placed on loans made by
certain financial institutions, such as small loan companies. Trienveiler Interview
supra note 67; see text accompanying notes 232-34 infra.
211. Of course, when a license is denied or removed, the dealer may be prosecuted
for operating without a license. In Michigan, these provisions are of primary importance in the sales of used automobiles. First, the fly-by-night operator is precluded
from selling new automobiles because of the requirement that new car dealers possess
a valid dealer franchise from a manufacturer. The new car buyer, especially in Detroit,
usually has a greater than average knowledge about automobiles than does the purchaser of a used car. The new-car dealer must therefore respond to this more knowledgeable group and cannot successfully use many sales gimmicks that he could use on
less sophisticated buyers. Of course, a new-car dealer may also possess a license to sell
used cars.
212. See notes 213-16, 218 infra and accompanying text.
213. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 257.248(b), 492.I04(b) (1967).
214. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(b) (1967).
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tions, suspensions, or revocations in Michigan. 215 But apart from the
character statement, no information is required concerning the applicant's business activities in other states. In general, therefore, the
license application process does not provide the issuing authority
with much information concerning the applicant's past business
dealings, especially those of a noncriminal nature or those committed
out of state.216
A possible solution to this problem is to require each applicant
to attest to his business ethics by submitting affidavits from the licensing authority or attorney general of each state in which he has conducted business activities. This requirement could eventually be supplemented by the establishment of a national data bank to maintain
records on actions taken against fraudulent dealers in all states; that
data bank could then be used by licensing authorities in screening
applicants. 217
The second reason for the ineffectiveness of licensing acts is that
the authorities do not use even the available information and resources to screen out undesirable applicants. Approval of a license
application is, for the most part, a purely clerical function. The
Motor Vehicle Code, for example, requires the Secretary of State to
make an investigation of the applicant's qualifications within fifteen
days after the receipt of the application. 218 In practice that investigation consists simply of a check of back files of the Department of
215. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.248(b) (1967).
216. Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 420-21.
217. This data bank would be similar in nature to the central file now used to
ensure that a driver who has had his operator's license revoked does not obtain a
license from another state. A state official would request information concerning the
history of an applicant and would then make a determination as to whether this
previous activity should bar the issuance of a license. The applicant would have an
opportunity to reply to the information placed in the file by various officials, both
before and during the licensing process. The file would be confidential, open only to
state licensing officials and the applicant.
Another possible improvement in the license application process would be to require the applicant to post a bond which would be forfeited if the dealer is found,
in an administrative or judicial proceeding, to have engaged in fraudulent business
practices. The bond would be used as a fund to reimburse defrauded victims who
complain to licensing authorities. This procedure would help to stimulate consumers
to file complaints. Applicants in Michigan are currently required to post a $10,000
civil indemnity bond. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.288(g) (1967). This bond is to
ensure that purchasers are reimbursed for any monetary loss caused by the fraudulent
practices of a dealer or his employees. Unfortunately, the surety is not required to
make reimbursement until judgment has been entered against the dealer in a court
of record. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(9) (1967). In reality this procedure makes
the bond worthless to an individual consumer, because the possible award is not high
enough to justify litigation. Since there is adequate judicial review of a decision made
by the Secretary of State [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.250(b) (1967)], there is no
compelling reason not to allow the Secretary of State to require dealers to make restitution to consumers as a condition of remaining in business. Such a requirement would
make the licensing structure a much more effective consumer aid.
218, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN, § 257.248(e) (1967).
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State to see if any action has ever been taken against the applicant,
a credit check, and a check of the files of the state police and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to see if the applicant has ever been
convicted of a felony. 219 Under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,
the Bureau of Financial Institutions is not required to go even that
far. Although the Bureau has extensive investigative powers under
the Act, 220 there is no statutory requirement £or an investigation, and
no application is ever challenged on the basis of information that
does not appear on the application form itself. In practice if all the
blanks on the application form are filled in correctly, and if the
license fee is paid, an employee of the Bureau issues the license. 221
License renewals are also a matter of form. The Motor Vehicle
Code specifically states that an investigation of a dealer seeking a
renewed license is not required. 222 It is unfortunate that so little
concern is exhibited for license renewals since even the most vigorous
preliminary investigations cannot eliminate all fraudulent dealers.
Moreover, the business character of a dealer is easier to ascertain after
a period of actual operation than it is before he has commenced functioning. If more stringent renewal provisions were enacted, a more
flexible approach to new applicants would be possible, since the
Secretary of State could then issue what would amount to probationary licenses to dealers with questionable backgrounds, and renewal
privileges could be conditioned upon the licensee's avoidance of
false and deceptive practices.
A necessary incident to an effective licensing scheme is participation by the public or by public agencies in the licensing process. A
consumer with a valid complaint against a dealer who is applying for
license renewal-or against a dealer who has changed his name or
location and is seeking a new license-should have the opportunity
to be heard in opposition to the dealer's application. At the present
time, the State of Michigan does not provide a specific procedure to
afford consumers such an opportunity.223 But a notice provision could
219. Interview with Joseph H. Mullaney, Legal Advisor to the Special License Di•
vision, Secretary of State's Office, Lansing, Michigan, Aug. 22, 1969 [hereinafter Mul•
laney Interview].
220. The Bureau may examine witnesses, issue subpoenas, and issue rules and regulations relating to the Act. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 492.110 (1967).
221. Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67.
222. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(e); see note 22!1 infra.
223. Under the Motor Vehicle Code, a complaint by a consumer, if it is in writing
and verified, could possibly lead to the denial of an application for the renewal of a
dealer's license. If the Secretary of State, after investigation, finds the complaint to be
meritorious, a full hearing may be conducted on that complaint. If the Secretary of
State finds at the hearing that the charges are true, he can then apply one of three
sanctions: suspension of the dealer's license, revocation of the license, or denial of an
application for renewal of the license. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.249-.250 (1967).
Of course, if a license is not due for renewal, denial of a renewal application is not
an available sanction. Since a license may expire at any of several dates during the
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be enacted requiring the Secretary of State to notify county prosecutors, the Attorney General, and the general public whenever license
applications are submitted.224 The current hearing procedure could
then be used to adjudicate challenges against a dealer. It would be
sufficient to allow challenges only against those applicants who seek
a general dealer license under the Motor Vehicle Code; if that general license is granted, the additional license for installment sales
could then be granted as a matter of course.225 In cases in which the
applicant's misconduct is not serious enough to warrant a rejection
of his application, another means of protecting consumers with rightful claims and of stimulating them to file complaints could be provided. The Secretary could be empowered in such cases to require
the applicant, as a condition of the issuance or renewal of his license,
to make restitution to the consumer who is challenging the application.226
Both the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act227 and the Motor Vehicle Code228 empower licensing officials to withdraw a dealer's license for disciplinary reasons. Under the former statute, the Financial
Institutions Bureau may revoke or suspend a license-after thirty
days notice is given to the offending dealer229-for any of ten reasons,
year [MICH. CO?,IP. L\ws ANN. § 257.248(d) (1967)], the chance that an individual consumer will intentionally become involved in the renewal process is slim.
224. In order to implement such a procedure, an applicant could be required to
submit notice of intent to seek a renewal thirty to sixty days before the expiration of
his old license. Notice could then be given to law-enforcement officials through a
newsletter and to the general public through an advertisement similar to those used
in liquor license renewals. Attorneys and groups dealing with consumers would presumably be alert to such publication; but to ensure notice, they could ask to be
placed on the mailing list for the newsletter. The extra cost could be offset by an increase in license fees. The costs of such an administrative procedure would probably
be minimal since most applications would probably not be challenged. To protect
the dealer, his license could be extended pending the outcome of the hearing.
225. The Bureau would still have the power to deny a renewal application on the
basis of a technical statutory violation under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act.
MICH. COMP. L\ws ANN. § 250.249 (1967). But the Bureau would no longer be empowered to reject a renewal request on the basis of complaints from buyers alleging
fraudulent sales practices.
226, Since the rather severe sanction of denial of a license is involved, it is necessary
that as much evidence as possible of dealer misconduct be presented at the hearing
and on review. Thus a primary advantage of this form of regulation is that it provides
the opportunity to present claims in an effective manner, particularly if consumer
groups become involved. To the extent that legal-services attorneys, urban clinics, and
indigenous consumer groups act on the renewal notices, they will help to provide the
needed link between the consumer and the government and thus will help to solve the
present problem of inaccessibility. In addition, there is less chance that a dealer will
escape sanction, as frequently happens in single-case adjudication, because of a failure
of a victim or witness to testify. See text accompanying note 254 infra.
227. MICH. CoMP. L\ws ANN. § 492.109(a) (1967).
228. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.249 (1967). For a discussion of the Secretary of
State's power to suspend or revoke a dealer's license under the Motor Vehicle Code,
see text accompanying note 241 infra.
229. MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.109(a) (1967).

962

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:926

including fraud in the sale of vehicles and willful failure to perform
any written agreement. 230 This power, however, is seldom if ever
used; indeed, in the past four years there have been no suspensions
or revocations under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. 231 One
reason for the lack of regulatory activity on the part of the Bureau
is that its administrator believes that the prime function of the
Bureau is not to regulate, but to use its extensive authority for the
purpose of examining dealer records to ensure that statutory requirements are met, licensing fees are paid, and financial integrity is maintained.232 Thus the administrator evinces a conscious policy of deferring to the Secretary of State in regard to matters of suspension or
revocation. The only regulatory role which the Bureau does play is
that of providing evidence and testifying at hearings and thereby
assisting the Secretary of State in processing complaints against
dealers.
The fact that the Financial Institutions Bureau does not pursue
an active role in dealer regulation, however, may not be of significant
consequence to the consumer, since the Bureau is not, as an institution, an appropriate agency to deal with the problems of consumer
fraud. The Bureau's primary administrative responsibility is to enforce the licensing requirements for lending institutions-requirements that are contained in the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act233
and the Small Loan Company Act. 234 The Bureau's expertise, therefore, is in the area of finance, not in the area of retail-sales operations.
In addition, two other factors prevent the Financial Institutions
Bureau from being of assistance to consumers. Very few buyers of
motor vehicles realize that the Bureau has been delegated authority
to oversee sellers,235 and the Bureau has made no attempt to encourage complaints from consumers and thereby to publicize its
role as overseer.236 The assistant prosecutor has occasionally referred
complaints to the Bureau, but no revocations or suspensions have
emanated from those referrals. 237 Moreover, as in the case of the other
agencies that are responsible for consumer protection, the Bureau is
plagued by a serious personnel shortage; there are only three investigators to police the 2,400 dealers and 230 financial institutions operating in Michigan. 238
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

LAws ANN. § 492.I09(a)(9) (1967).
Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67.
Id. See note 210 supra and accompanying text.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.101 (1967).
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 493.1-.26 (1967).
Donnelly Interview, supra note 98; Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67.
Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67.
MICH. CO.IIP.
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It seems obvious, therefore, that the Financial Institutions Bureau
is not an effective agency for protecting the consumer from deceptive
sales practices by automobile dealers.239 Indeed, one of the problems
with consumer protection legislation in Michigan is that the relevant
statutes vest regulatory and enforcement authority in diverse agencies
that are usually inadequately funded and that are often ill-suited for
the task of combatting fraudulent business practices. It would seem
much more logical, for example, to limit the jurisdiction of the
Bureau to the function it performs best-ensuring the financial integrity of licensed lending institutions-and to turn over its nominal authority in the consumer fraud area to the Secretary of
State or to the Attorney General. If nothing else, this change
would help to centralize enforcement authority and would focus responsibility for the safeguarding of consumer interests upon elected
state officials.240
The Secretary of State, however, must follow a more complicated
procedure to revoke or suspend a license than must the Financial
Institutions Bureau. Under the Motor Vehicle Code,241 the Secretary
must investigate the circumstances of any complaint in order to decide whether further proceedings are warranted. If the complaint is
substantiated, the Secretary must give the licensee ten-days notice
before a formal hearing is held on the merits. If, at the hearing, the
hearing examiner finds against the licensee, he may enter an order
suspending or revoking the license, and that order becomes final in
thirty days unless in the meantime the licensee appeals to a circuit
court.
This administrative process is usually initiated by a complaint
from one of the one hundred field investigators of the Department of
State.242 But since the field investigators are empowered to enforce
the entire Motor Vehicle Code, not just the licensing provisions,243
they cannot, as a practical matter, spend much of their time investigating fraudulent sales practices.244 Thus, while fraudulent practices
are a basis for suspension under the Motor Vehicle Code,245 com239. See note 210 supra.
240. The current enforcement machinery, in addition to inhibiting consumer access, tends to disperse consumer pressure for reform. Consumers could use their political powers to better advantage if one agency were made responsible for the bulk of
consumer protection programs.
241. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.250 (1967).
242. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219.
243. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.248-.250 (1967).
244. Most of the work of the investigators does not involve consumer fraud. Complaints usually relate to (I) violations of the reporting requirements that are established to assist in the prosecution of automobile thefts, (2) cases involving the
withholding or fraudulent concealment of payments owed to the state, or (3) cases
involving dealers operating without a proper license. Mullaney Interview, supra note
219.
245. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.249(d) (1967).
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plaints are rarely received alleging such practices, and licenses are
seldom suspended for reasons of dealer fraud. 246 Indeed, one of the
first cases decided under the Motor Vehicle Code stated that the
purpose of the licensing provisions was to ensure compliance with
statutory requirements relating to reports and payment of revenues, 247 rather than to protect the consumer.
Complaints are also received at times from a county prosecutor
or a private group such as the Better Business Bureau, but rarely
are they received from a private citizen.248 As with the Financial
Institutions Bureau, few consumers, especially those living in the
inner city, realize that they can tum to the Secretary of State for
protection against dishonest automobile dealers. 249 There is little
publicity concerning this function of the Secretary, and branch offices
either refuse to process consumer complaints or do so with little
enthusiasm.250
Despite all the difficulties, however, a number of consumer fraud
complaints are received each year, and some of them are deemed
serious enough to require a full hearing.251 In those cases the one
attorney in the license division usually acts as hearing officer, with
a deputy attorney general designated as prosecutor.252 Both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General are unhappy about this procedure, because it requires that a deputy attorney general be called
from an undermanned staff in order to prosecute a matter with
which he has little familiarity and which is usually based on a technical violation. 253 As a consequence, prosecutions are probably not
as vigorous as they might be in the hands of a knowledgeable prose246. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219.
247. Powers v. Vignam, 312 Mich. 315, 20 N.W.2d 203 (1945). This case was decided
under a predecessor of the present act, MICH. COMP. LAws § 256.114(c) (1948).
248. The fact that complaints are seldom received from private citizens is probably
due to the lack of publicity about the Department and to the fact that very little
mediation is done. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219.
249. Donnelly Interview, supra note 98; Mullaney Interview, supra note 219.
250. The head of the Wayne County prosecutor's Fraud Section, who was deputized
to prosecute one of the few actual consumer fraud cases heard recently, remarked that
the assistant attorney general usually assigned to consumer fraud cases was inclined to
adjourn the proceedings frequently or even to settle the case and dismiss the hearing.
Nolan Interview, supra note 18.
251. There are five levels of administrative action that can be utilized to process an
alleged violation of the Motor Vehicle Code by a dealer. They range in complexity
from the field level district proceeding-in which an investigator merely obtains an
assurance from the dealer that the prohibited conduct will not continue--to a formal
hearing. In fiscal 1968-1969, 317 dealers were cited for violating the Motor Vehicle
Code. Of these dealers, only 49 were required to appear for a formal hearing. The
remaining dealers had their cases settled either by a less formal proceeding or without
any administrative hearing. Telephone Interview with Peter Bommarito, Director of
Public Relations, Office of the Secretary of State, Lansing, Michigan, March 3, 1970.
252. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219.
253. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219; Platsis Interview, supra note 44.
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cuting attorney. There is also the problem of obtaining witnesses.
Most hearings are held in Lansing with the result that witnesses,
especially those from Detroit, often fail to appear. 254 The Department
has taken steps to rectify this problem and has recently shown a
willingness to move hearings to Detroit if inner-city residents are
involved.2 1>5
If the hearing examiner finds against the dealer on the complaint,
he may enter an order suspending the dealer's license for a specified
period of time. In almost every case, the dealer exercises his right of
appeal to the circuit court.256 Of course, the actual suspension is delayed and the accused dealer is permitted to continue in business as
usual pending the disposition of the appeal.257 Although the circuit
court is not supposed to conduct a de novo review, it may, at its
discretion, receive evidence that was not available at the time of the
hearing. 258 The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, but to
ascertain whether it supports the findings of the hearing examiner.259
In practice, the same problems exist in these appellate proceedings
as in appellate proceedings under criminal statutes; judges usually do
not have a complete record of the licensee's wrongdoing and thus
generally treat him as a first offender.260 Accordingly, they either make
an independent judgment of guilt or greatly reduce the penalty
imposed by the hearing officer.261
Even in the rare cases in which the license of a fraudulent dealer
is ultimately suspended or revoked, 262 however, the defrauded consumer gains no benefit apart from the satisfaction of having the dealer's license removed. Moreover, the dishonest dealer may suffer no
real penalty, for nothing in the statute prohibits the issuance of a
new license to a relative or a business associate of the dealer, and
the dealer's business may thus proceed as usual after a brief "remodeling."
In light of the delays and other difficulties associated with the
254. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.250(b) (1967).
258. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.250(b) (1967).
259. See Salway v. Alger, 321 Mich. 211, 32 N.W.2d 505 (1948). It should be noted
that in this case the dealer continued to function during the review.
260. See text accompanying notes 186-88 supra.
261. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219.
262. During fiscal year 1968-1969, forty-nine cases were scheduled for a formal
hearing. In two cases the dealer's license was revoked, while in two others a suspension
was ordered. Three dealers went out of business pending the hearing. Five were given
a conditional suspension on the condition that if any additional violations were de•
tected during a stated period, the Secretary of State could seize the license without
additional proceedings. The remaining cases are still pending. Bommarito Interview,
supra note 251.
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present license removal process that is administered by the Secretary
of State, it seems advantageous to develop some alternative means
of dealing with fraudulent automobile dealers. Perhaps the best
method is to include in a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute
a provision granting the Attorney General broad powers to combat
all fraudulent business practices. Under such a provision, all jurisdiction over consumer fraud would be centralized in the Attorney
General's office, and automobile dealers would be treated in the
same manner as other retail merchants.263 The Secretary of State
would retain the power to hold hearings and to remove dealer licenses
for reasons other than fraudulent business practices, but all fraud
complaints would go directly to the Attorney General. If the Attorney General finds that a particular automobile dealer has engaged in
illegal practices, he could directly order the dealer's license to be
suspended or revoked, or he could take other administrative action
against the dealer and submit the results of the hearing to the Secretary of State for a determination of whether the dealer's license
should be removed. In the event that the latter procedure is followed,
the Secretary could make his decision without the added cost or delay
of another administrative hearing.
The primary advantage of such a system is that it would allow a
full range of sanctions to be applied against a dishonest automobile
dealer and would thus provide relief for the individual complainant
as well as for the general public. If such a system were combined with
increased public involvement in the licensing and renewal process,:io~
the consumer would be afforded significantly more protection against
dishonest automobile dealers than he now receives from the lethargic
practices of the Secretary of State.
C. Attorney General
In approximately half of the states, including Michigan, a consumer fraud branch of the attorney general's office has been created
either by statute or administrative action.265 But only in those states
with strong deceptive-practice legislation, and centralized administration of that legislation is sufficient authority delegated to that
branch to allow the agency to be effective.266 In Michigan, therefore,
263. For a further discussion of the possibility of making the attorney general the
administrator of a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute, see pt. II. C. infra.
264. See text accompanying notes 223-26 supra.
265. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Action, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 429 (1966). Since that comment was published, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Missouri have established consumer fraud bureaus.
See ch. 143, §§ 1-16, [1969] COLO. LAws 371-76; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 1-12
(Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.010-130 (Supp. 1969).
266. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93a, §§ 1-9 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-13
(Supp. 1969). These are probably the two strongest consumer-fraud statutes in the
nation.
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the Consumer Fraud Bureau, like the similar agencies that exist in
the numerous other states with a piecemeal approach to consumer
protection,267 has few powers beyond the prestige of the Attorney
General's office.
The Consumer Fraud Bureau in Michigan was instituted by the
Attorney General in 1959 without any action by the legislature; in
fact, the first monetary expenditure for the Bureau was not authorized until several years later.268 The current budgetary allocation
for the Bureau is only 60,000 dollars per year, which permits the
hiring of one deputy attorney general, one investigator, and three
secretaries.269 The Bureau makes no attempt to solicit complaintsfor obvious economic and practical reasons-but approximately 1,500
complaints are received annually at the Lansing office, either by
phone or by mail. 270 About sixty per cent of those complaints are
mediated successfully; the rest are abandoned unresolved or are
referred to some other agency. 271
The Bureau views its role as primarily that of encouraging settlements, usually through a letter or a phone call to the offending merchant.272 To a large extent, this limited view is a function of the lack
of enforcement machinery at the Bureau's disposal. Apart from its
general powers of persuasion and the ability to use the threat of
adverse publicity, the Bureau 4as only three tools of enforcement
that may be invoked against a dishonest merchant: the injunctive
provisions of the Retail Installment Sales Act, 273 those of the Home
Improvement Finance Act,274 and those of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 275 As noted previously, these provisions are generally ineffective to combat most fraudulent practices.276 The Bureau does
maintain a "hot line" with prosecutors, better business bureaus, and
other interested groups, in order to exchange information and to
267. Comment, supra note 265, at 430-33. For an attorney general's view, see Saxbe,
The Role of Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes
Section of the Ohio Attorney General, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1968).
268, Platsis Interview, supra note 44; Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E, at 1, col. 4.
269. Platsis Interview, supra note 44.
270. Id.
271. Id. For example, automobile cases are referred to the Secretary of State for
possible licensing actions, and complaints against food dealers are referred to the
Insurance Bureau of the Department of Commerce. In addition, if criminal sanctions
seem warranted, notice is given to the appropriate county prosecutor.
272. Platsis Interview, supra note 44.
273, MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.869 (1967).
274. MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1422 (1967).
275. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.807 (1967); see text accompanying notes 140-50
supra.
276. See text accompanying notes 59-65 supra. The injunctive provisions of the
Retail Installment Sales Act and Home Improvement Finance Act have never been
utilized either by the Attorney General or by a local prosecutor. Platsis Interview,
supra note 44,
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plot strategy for dealing with fraud schemes that are statewide.277
But the "hot line" does not significantly benefit consumers because
of the inability of the Bureau to apply adequate remedial provisions.
Moreover, focusing upon statewide fraud schemes ignores the retail
dealers' localized dishonest practices, which daily plague the urban
poor.
Although the Consumer Fraud Bureau is severely handicapped
by an almost complete lack of effective enforcement powers, the Attorney General frequently recommends new legislation and is currently urging the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission's Uniform Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act. 278 But until there
is legislation providing the Attorney General with comprehensive
jurisdiction and enforcement powers with respect to fraud in the
market place, little can be expected from the Consumer Fraud Bureau in the way of effective action against dishonest merchants.
Ill.

SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

It seems apparent that the present statutory and administrative
measures in Michigan for the relief of defrauded consumers are
totally inadequate. The lack of integration in Michigan's statutory
scheme, combined with the relative impotence of the substantive
provisions dealing with consumer fraud, ensure that little can be
done under current law to aid the victims of fraudulent business
practices. The deficiencies in Michigan's statutory scheme are compounded by the lack of effective action in this area from judicial and
nongovernmental sources. The courts, instead of implementing
needed reform in judicial administration, provide a system of justice
that is unintelligible to the vast majority of citizens and seems oppressive to those most in need of assistance. Default judgments,219
277. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § :E, at 1, col. l; Platsis Interview, supra note 44.
278. Platsis Interview, supra note 44.
279. The vast majority of suits by finance companies or merchants against consumers are disposed of through default judgments. Indeed, the sales practices of many
inner-city merchants are designed to rely upon eventual default by the consumer,
followed quickly by a default judgment, repossession and resale of the goods, and
garnishment. FTC CREDIT R.EPOl!.T, supra note 5, at 34. The common pleas court in
Detroit, with nine full-time judges, handled 57,142 "assumpsit" and 6,445 "replevin"
cases in 1968. 1968 ANNUAL !UP0RT OF COMMON PLEAS COURT 2. No figures are available as to the percentage of these cases disposed of through default judgments, but
73,023 of the 76,258 cases adjudicated were not contested. Furthermore, $20,489,194 of
the $22,882,243 awarded in judgments resulted from proceedings in which no defendant appeared. Id. at 4. Staff members of the .Michigan Law Review examined, at
random, several hundred assumpsit and replevin case records and were unable to find
any in which a consumer had interposed an answer to the complaint.
Aside from the social problems caused by such summary justice, this system wastes
the money of taxpayers by providing merchants with an inexpensive collection agency;
the court fees charged to merchants obtaining default judgments do not begin to cover
the costs of operating the common pleas court. Interview with Herbert Levin, Clerk,
Common Pleas Court, Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 16, 1969 [hereinafter Levin Interview].

.April 1970]

Comments

969

garnishment,280 lack of effective representation, 281 and an archaic
body of common law282 are conspicuous realities in lower courts that
adjudicate debtor-creditor controversies. In addition, private groups
and industry self-regulation have proved inadequate to combat the
problem of consumer fraud. 283 Despite the seriousness of these prob280. Due to the outdated record-keeping system of the common pleas court, it is
impossible to determine what percentage of the default judgments entered by that
court against defendants eventually lead to garnishments. The clerk estimates, and it
seems reasonable to conclude, that almost all default judgments result in garnishment.
Levin Interview, supra note 279. The common pleas court has experimented with a
partial pa}ment plan as an alternative to garnishment. Under that plan, a judgment
debtor may avoid garnishment by paying to the court weekly an amount that is commensurate with his income and with the amount of the judgment. Unfortunately,
during 1968-1969, 9,133 partial-payment orders were cancelled because of failure to pay,
while only 13,330 new orders were entered. 1968 ANNUAL REPORT OF COMMON Pu:AS
COURT 7. Thus the partial payment plan has not worked in Detroit, For discussions of
wage garnishment, see Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214 (1965); Kerr, Wage Garnishment Should Be Prohibited, 2 PROSP.Ecrus 371 (1968); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is
a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas
of the Law, 68 MICH, L. R.Ev. 986 (1970).
281. The problem of lack of effective representation for defrauded consumers is
basically one of money-the amounts in dispute are too small to warrant litigationand lack of knowledge on the part of the poor concerning how to utilize the services
of attorneys. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L.
R.Ev. I, 46-48 (1969). One possible solution to that problem, the establishment of legal
services for the poor, is currently hindered by a lack of funds. The Detroit legal services office has only one attorney specializing in consumer cases, and he must consequently limit himself to suits which are of precedent-setting value, The attorneys at
the neighborhood offices are so pressed for time that they are often able to do little
more than make a phone call or send a letter to an offending merchant. Many times
such a merchant settles with complaining consumers as soon as he is informed that
legal services are involved. But, while this provides restitution to some consumers, it
has no deterrent value against continued unfair practices. Donnelly Interview, supra
note 98. Moreover, test litigation undertaken by legal-services attorneys in an attempt
to make the common law more responsive to the needs of the poor is expensive,
lengthy, and usually fruitless. On the whole it is an ineffective alternative to statutory
change as a vehicle for reform in the area of consumer protection. For an article illustrating these difficulties, sec Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test
Litigation, 44 N.Y.U, L. R.Ev. 115 (1969).
282. In regard to the substantive problems of consumer suits for damages, see
Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Consumer Have a
Private Remedy?, 1968 DuKE L.J. 831.
283. See Comment, supra note 265, at 404-09. See also Project, The Direct Selling
Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 UCLA L. R.Ev. 890, 931-42 (1969), in which the
student author concluded that "the [Better Business) Bureau's capacity for aggressive pro·
tection of consumers is drastically limited by jts need to avoid alienating its source
of funds, the local businessmen." Id. at 940. Although the Detroit Better Business
Bureau (BBB) handled over 18,000 complaints or inquiries last year, it is similarly
limited in its ability to aid inner-city consumers effectively, The major handicap of the
BBB is the fact that it does not enjoy the confidence of the poor consumers who are
most in need of its assistance. This handicap is evidenced by the fact that one half of
all complaints or inquiries to the BBB traditionally come not from the inner city or
even Detroit, but from the more affluent suburban areas. Caucus, October 1969, at 1
{BBB Newsletter). Indeed, the problem is so acute that poor consumers have undertaken the task of organizing their own parallel group, the Consumer Protection Association, Inc, The objective of that association is to allow the poor to become involved
in consumer protection activities and to utilize the power of organized consumers to
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lems, state officials, including the Governor, do not seem to have
placed a high priority on the restructuring of consumer legislation; 284
elicit needed reform. Interview with Consumer Research Advisory Council, Detroit,
Michigan, Aug. 21, 1969.
Perhaps the most fundamental handicap of the BBB in regard to its relationship
with poor consumers is that it can do little to solve their problems. To most con•
sumers, the primary function of the BBB is to adjust their complaints with merchants.
Successful mediation, however, depends upon the willingness of the merchant to make
some sort of restitution or to change his sales practices. Absent that willingness, the
consumer may be advised to seek other remedies. Caucus, Sept. 1968, at 2. (Interestingly enough, this publication, which mentions specific merchants engaging in
fraudulent schemes, is not distributed to the general public.) If the deceptive practice
of the scheme involved is pervasive enough, and if the violator refuses all requests for
voluntary action, the BBB may inform various members of the advertising media and
suggest that advertisements for the scheme be discontinued. Of course, this procedure
reaches only deceptive advertisements and does so only long after the fraudulent
practices have been instituted. As a last resort, the records of the BBB may be turned
over to governmental authorities empowered to prosecute offenders engaging in consumer fraud. But this last resort also fails to provide the defrauded consumer with
relief for past fraudulent transactions of the dealer.
The other major service of the BBB, answering inquiries from prospective customers concerning the integrity of particular merchants, suffers because the informa•
tion given is limited to the number of complaints against that merchant; no opinion
is given regarding these practices. In addition, for those who have not had the foresight to inquire before purchasing-probably the vast majority of low-income consumers-this service is useless.
The success of the self-imposed guidelines so favored by the BBB as a restraint
upon merchants depends upon voluntary cooperation from the businessmen, and it
seems unlikely that the patently fraudulent operators are going to be influenced by
these standards. Special Report: Truth in Advertising, Caucus, Nov. 1968. In summary,
it appears that the BBB, operating from its vantage point as an arm of the business
community, is simply not attuned to the serious nature of the problems that innercity consumers face or to the need for strong action to alleviate those problems. The
BBB may even have an over-all negative impact on consumer interests, since the BBB
often opposes reform and provides businessmen with a friendly regulator to whom
they can point in order to show that business does indeed "care."
The other major business group, the Chamber of Commerce, is equally useless
and is also a formidable opponent of reform. The Chamber of Commerce views its
function as that of providing lines of communication between consumers and management in order to facilitate resolution of general consumer problems. To further
this goal, the Chamber is working to have prominent business leaders speak to con•
sumer groups both to allow consumers to air complaints and to educate consumers
about their rights. While this program appears to be based upon good intentions, the
Chamber suffers from an even greater distrust on the part of the poor consumer than
does the BBB; leaders of consumer groups in Detroit are unanimous in their characterization of the Chamber as the enemy, not the ally, of the poor consumer. Interview
with the Consumers Research Advisory Council, supra. If the Chamber merely did
nothing constructive to aid consumers, it would not be a major obstacle to consumer
reform; the Chamber is, after all, a business group, not a consumer protection agency.
But the Chamber does not remain passive; rather, it opposes all new legislation on
the ground that present laws are sufficient. Its position is that additional legislation
would "restrict" reputable businessmen and be nothing more than another tool for
government to harass legitimate operators. Interview with Robert P. Marquart, Vice•
President, Detroit Chamber of Commerce, Aug. 19, 1969. While this attitude is perhaps
to be eJ<.pected from such a group, it is certainly evidence of the Chamber's inability
to aid oppressed consumers.
284. See Governor's State of the State Message, Jan. 15, 1970; Governor's Budget
Message, Feb. 5, 1970.
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and the few potentially helpful bills that have been recently introduced languish in committee.28 5
The need for statutory reform in most of the states has been recognized by three eminent groups: the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), the Council of State Governments (CSG), and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
Each has prepared a model consumer protection act.286 Several states
have already enacted broad deceptive-practices legislation, patterned
after the FTC or CSG model acts. 287
In form the three acts are quite similar; all are comprehensive
deceptive-practices statutes which vest a single administrator-usually
the state attorney general-with broad enforcement powers encompassing an array of remedial devices. 288 Such legislation has been
attacked by some advocates of consumer interests on the ground that
it leads to an over-all reduction in activities which protect the consumer.289 A survey by the Michigan Law Review indicates that in
those states with comprehensive deceptive-practices legislation, prosecutors and other consumer protection agencies do tend to defer to
the attorney general and to reduce substantially, if not to eliminate,
their own antifraud activities. 290 Nevertheless, this type of legislation
does offer the advantages of coordination and consistent enforcement
throughout the state. As the arguments of the critics suggest, however,
care must be taken to ensure that the increased centralization of enforcement authority does not produce an illusory victory for the consumer. Passing a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute without
substantially increasing the powers and resources of the statute's administrator would most likely reduce statewide protection efforts.
But if the administrator is granted broad powers, it is difficult to
imagine how the level of protection afforded consumers could be
reduced. At least in Michigan, the various agencies charged with the
responsibility of combatting consumer fraud have demonstrated so
285. The Attorney General's proposal for enactment of the FTC's recommended
act has not been considered by the legislature; the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
has not been reported out of committee; and the proposal to establish a city consumer agency in Detroit has not been enacted seven months after a special mayor's
task force recommended the proposal to the legislature. Interview with Andrew Eiler,
Executive Secretary, Michigan Consumers Council, Lansing, Michigan, Oct. 14,
1969; Platsis Interview, supra note 44.
286. See notes 293-95 supra. The NCCUSL act is currently in the third tentative
draft and is still being considered by committee. It has not been adopted by the whole
conference.
287. HAWAII REV. LAws §§ 205A-l to -22 (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.010-.130
{Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 56:8-1 to -12 (1964); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010.920 (Supp. 1968).
288. See text accompanying notes 316-41 infra.
289. See note 173 supra. See also Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Consumer
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM. L. REV. 445, 445-47 (1968).
290. See note 175 supra and accompan}ing text.
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little success in that endeavor that almost any effective action from
another source would be a distinct improvement.
In Michigan, the administrator of a deceptive-practices statute
should be the Attorney General. His role as administrator under such
a statute would be in keeping with his role as chief law-enforcement
officer of the state. Moreover, the Attorney General's office already
has a Consumer Fraud Bureau-although it is currently understaffed
and inadequately funded291-which could be expanded to provide
the administrative apparatus necessary to implement a pervasive consumer fraud statute. Finally, since the Attorney General is basically
a prosecutorial official, he can be expected to take more vigorous and
forthright action against dishonest merchants than would other agencies or officials who view themselves more as administrative functionaries than as law enforcers. As mentioned previously,292 it might be
useful to provide county prosecutors-particularly those in counties
that enclose urban areas-with concurrent jurisdiction under the
deceptive-practices statute, or to make them agents of the Attorney
General for the purpose of enforcing the statutory provisions. The
latter possibility is perhaps the more desirable one, since it would
avoid dispersal of authority and would help to maintain the centralized character of the enforcement process.
In order to be effective, a deceptive-practices statute must meet
several basic requirements. First, it must be truly comprehensive,
that is, it must include within its coverage as many varieties of
fraudulent practices as possible. The FTC proposed act defines the
scope of its coverage very broadly by prohibiting unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade.293 The CSG act accepts
this broad definition as the most appropriate one,294 while the
NCCUSL act simply prohibits any deceptive practice in a consumer
transaction.295 The NCCUSL act further defines the general category
deceptive act, without limiting its scope, by listing thirteen practices
that are specifically prohibited.296 Unlike other statutes in which
enumeration of prohibited acts adds little to the coverage,287 the
NCCUSL act probably reaches more deceptive methods with the
specification than without. The first twelve subsections are apparently an attempt to ensure that the most common deceptive practices are prohibited, including "bait" advertising, 298 misrepresenting
291. See text accompanying notes 268-72 supra.
292. See text accompanying notes 181-82 supra.
293. FI'C UNIFORM Ac::r § 2. See also § 3, whic;h mandates that courts of the enacting state are to be guided by judicial interpretations given to the Federal Trade
Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(5) (1964). See note 43 supra.
294. CSG Ac::r § 2, alternative I.
295. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(a).
296. NCCUSL Acr §§ 2{b)(l)-(12), (c).
297. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-115(c) (Supp. 1968).
298. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(b)(6); see note 142 supra.
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used goods as new,299 and referral sales,300 while the last section is
aimed at unconscionable transactions. 301 The last section is necessary
because of the possibility that some overreaching activities by merchants may not constitute deceptive practices within the meaning of
that term as it is usually defined; 302 in that event the general prohibition against unconscionability should be available as a final protection for the consumer.303 If a practice is neither deceptive nor unconscionable, it probably should be beyond the reach of a regulatory
statute, and any confusion by the consumer will have to be alleviated
by consumer education or self-regulation. In summary, the best approach to providing maximum protection for the consumer seems to
be adoption of the FTC standard, supplemented by the NCCUSL
299. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(b)(3).
300. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(b)(ll). A referral sale is one in which the consumer is induced to purchase goods by the seller's representations to the consumer that the consumer will be able to recoup the purchase price by referring others to the seller as
potential customers. In reality, the odds against any consumer earning as much as his
purchase price by referring potential customers to the seller are astronomical. For an
illustrative case, see Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
301. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2 (emphasis added):
(c) An act or practice of a supplier is unlawful, if:
(1) it is unconscionable; and
(2) the unconscionability involves a consumer transaction.
(d) Without limiting the scope of subsection (c) the following factors are to be
considered in applying that subsection:
(I) that the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of
the agreement, lack of education, or similar factors;
(2) that the supplier has knowingly charged a price which is grossly in excess
of the price at which similar property or services is readily obtainable in
similar consumer transactions by lik~ consumers;
(ll) that the supplier knew at the time of the consumer transaction of the inability of the consumer to receive substantial benefits from the subject of
the consumer transaction; or
(4) that the supplier knowingly required the consumer to waive substantial
legal rights.
The only difficulty with this section is the requirement of knowledge on the part
of the supplier. Not only does that requirement present a substantial evidentiary problem for the prosecutor-even with his ability to obtain records and oral testimonybut it also deprives the consumer of needed relief. To a consumer who has purchased
goods that are worthless, or are grossly overpriced, it makes little difference whether
or not the merchant had knowledge of the unconscionable nature of the transaction.
302. For example, a statement concerning the quality of goods may be only
"puffing," an opinion to the average consumer and hence not deceptive. The same
statement if made to a poor, ignorant consumer may still not be deceptive, but it
probably is unconscionable. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the
Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. R.Ev. 559, 597-98 (1968),
803. Consumers can, of course, rely on UCC § 2-302, which prohibits unconscionable contractual provisions, but a similar prohibition in a deceptive-practices statute
might be more effective. The NCCUSL act, for example, provides a broader range of
remedies than is available under UCC § 2-302. See text accompanying notes 325·31
infra. Moreover, the additional guidelines presented in the NCCUSL act concerning
what constitutes unconscionable conduct may stimulate the courts to extend the concept to more unfair transactions.
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act's specifications, particularly its prohibition against unconscionable
transactions.
The second basic requirement of an effective deceptive-practices
statute is that it provide the attorney general with broad investigative
and decision-making powers. Ideally the attorney general should do
more than simply prosecute individual cases based upon consumer
complaints. He should be granted authority to conduct investigations
and to issue rulings in order to help establish standards of conduct
for dealers covered by the statute. The power to investigate, along
with the authority to request both documentary evidence and the
presence of witnesses, should not be limited to judicial proceedings.
A provision granting the attorney general broad investigative powers
would allow him to keep abreast of developments in the marketing
of retail goods and would assist him in formulating consumer education programs to inform the public about the types of fraudulent
schemes and practices that are currently being used by merchants.
The statute should also grant the attorney general the authority to
issue a specific advisory ruling at the request of a businessman, since
that authority would allow merchants to ascertain the legality of a
particular sales practice before putting it into operation and would
thus protect the public from potentially injurious activities.304 Finally, granting the attorney general the power to establish general
regulations would be desirable, because such regulations could be
used by reputable merchants as guidelines for fair conduct.305
In this area the NCCUSL act provides the narrowest provisions.
Although it permits public hearings to be held at any time,806 it
allows investigations only when there is probable cause to believe
304. The use of advisory opinions would remove one of the arguments against
strict enforcement of a broad range of statutory remedies-the fear of injuring inno•
cent businessmen. If the declaratory or advisory ruling, as opposed to a general regulation, were made appealable, the merchant would be able to embark on a course of
conduct with full knowledge of its legal implications. If the merchant were to choose
not to avail himself of the right to obtain an advisory opinion, there would be no
reason for not applying sanctions against him.
A specific advisory ruling would be binding on the state, but only with respect to
the merchant requesting the ruling, unless the administrator were to adopt the ruling
as a regulation. Consumers, however, should be bound neither by a private ruling of
the administrator nor by any general regulations defining permissible conduct. This
freedom would permit the private suit to operate as a continuing check upon any
complacency of, or lack of innovative action by, the state agency. See Spanogle, The
U3C-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 624, 629-S0 (1968).
305. Not only would reputable merchants be sure of what is legal, but the public
would have a standard by which to judge a seller's practices. That standard would
help to provide another enforcement tool-public opinion and consumer pressure.
Most merchants are probably sufficiently afraid of losing business that they will not
engage in practices that the public can readily identify as illegal. Publishing guidelines
might also generate more complaints, since the public would realize that certain acts
are illegal and that such acts can be stopped. See Spanogle, supra note 304, at 629.
306. NCCUSL Acr § 4(a).
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that an individual has committed a violation. 807 The FTC proposed
act, on the other hand, requires only that an investigation relate to
a "possible" violation of the statute,308 while the CGS act stipulates
simply that an investigation is permissible if it appears to the attorney
general that a dealer has engaged in, or is about to engage in, a practice violative of the act. 300 In addition, the CSG provisi_on permits the
attorney general, whenever he deems it to be in the public interest,
to undertake an investigation in order to ascertain whether a violation is being committed.310 Both the NCCUSL and the CSG acts
permit the attorney general to issue regulations and guidelines defining deceptive practices,311 but the FTC statute contains no provisions
relating to those matters. Unlike the NCCUSL provision, however,
the CSG act stipulates that such regulations are to have the force of
law.312 Only the NCCUSL act specifically authorizes the attorney
general to render advisory opinions,313 but it is arguable that such
power is included in the right to make regulations. Under all three
acts, failure to comply with a court order enforcing an investigative
demand is punishable by contempt sanctions; 314 but the CSG proposal goes even further and provides that, if a suspected violator
refuses to cooperate, a court, upon the motion of the attorney general, may enjoin the violator from doing business or may remove his
307. NCCUSL Acr §§ 4(a), (b), (c). The provision for a public hearing does not give
the administrator the authority to administer oaths, to compel attendance of witnesses,
or to subpoena records; that power is given only when an investigation is authorized,
and such an investigation may be undertaken only if there is probable cause that a
merchant is violating the act. The drafters of the act, however, apparently do not intend to require the same level of evidence to establish probable cause under the act
as would be required to establish probable cause to arrest a suspect in a criminal case.
The "slightest amount" of proof showing a violation would be enough to establish
probable cause under the NCCUSL act; only the so-called "fishing expedition" would
be prohibited. Interview with William J. Pierce, Executive-Secretary, NCCUSL, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, Feb. 27, 1970. The actual standard envisioned, then, seems to be
much less stringent than that applied to criminal cases. But care should be taken in
drafting such a standard to ensure that the wording used clearly communicates the
desired meaning. In the hands of an unfriendly or ignorant judge, the term "probable
cause" could be interpreted much more strictly than the term "slightest amount."
308. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 7(a).
309. CSG Ac::r § ll(a).
310. CSG § ll(a).
311. NCCUSL Acr § 4(b); CSG Acr § 3(a). A later section in the NCCUSL act
authorizing the administrator to ask for a declaratory judgment concerning the legality of any conduct casts doubt upon the force that the rulings are intended to have.
It seems that those rulings are simply "advisory" and are not to be given the same
weight as a formal administrative regulation.
312, CSG Acr § 12.
313. NCCUSL Acr § 4(b). The administrator must first consult with "interested
parties," presumably business and consumer groups, and must hold hearings "if appropriate."
314. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 7(i); CSG Acr § 14(3); NCCUSL Acr § 4(c)(3).
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corporate charter.315 Obviously, severe sanctions are needed to deal
with uncooperative suspects, since a dealer's refusal to cooperate not
only indicates a greater likelihood that he has committed a violation,
but also makes it more difficult for the attorney general to gain access
to the dealer's records and thus in many instances may reduce the
chance for conviction.316 It would be anomalous to allow a fraudulent
merchant to continue in business, simply because he refuses to obey
an investigative order.
The third requirement of a deceptive-practices statute is that it
provide the attorney general with a wide range of effective enforcement powers which he can use both to stop the prohibited conduct
and to obtain restitution for defrauded consumers. In this connection, the attorney general may, of course, be empowered to make use
of the adjudicatory process of the courts. All three model acts have
provisions permitting the attorney general to seek an injunction
ordering the merchant involved to cease the fraudulent practices
in which he is allegedly engaged or in which there is reason to believe
he is about to engage. 317 All three statutes provide that, if the injunction is violated, a penalty may be exacted from the offending dealer.
The FTC proposed act provides for a penalty of 2,500 dollars for
violating the injunction,318 the CSG act mandates the same penalty
for each violation,319 and the NCCUSL statute establishes a 5,000dollar fine for each day that the merchant continues the deceptive
practice.320 Two of the acts, however-the FTC statute and the
NCCUSL statute-have a significant drawback. Under both, if a
court finds that a practice violative of the act is occurring or is about
to occur, it may issue an injunction prohibiting the merchant from
315. CSG Acr § 14(1), (2), (3); see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, § 266 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 8 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-6
(1964).
316. Discovery and subpoena powers would allow the attorney general to obtain
quickly and easily important information such as the wholesale price of goods sold,
the source of allegedly "new" merchandise, or the actual quantity of advertised goods
that was available for sale. While much of this information could probably be obtained under Michigan's civil discovery rules (see MICH. CT. R. 302-13), arming the
Attorney General with the authority to issue his own discovery orders has many advantages. He could pursue his inquiries without the necessity of litigation; he could
not be compelled to submit to deposition or discovery by the defendant; and he would
not be bound by the requirement that the material sought or the questions asked be
admissible as evidence. Perhaps of greatest significance would be the additional penalties prescribed for failure to comply with a court order enforcing a demand. See text
accompanying note 315 supra, Providing the attorney general only with the powers
available to an ordinary litigant, then, needlessly limits the flexibility of the state in
obtaining needed information, and encourages defendants to delay enforcement proceedings.
317, FTC Acr § 5; CSG Acr § 5; NCCUSL Ar;r § 5.
318. FTC UNIFORM Ar;r § 8.
319. CSG Acr § 15(a). It is conceivable that under this provision each sale could be
a violation.
320. NCCUSL Acr § 5(a)(l).

April 1970]

Comments

977

engaging in that practice in the future; 821 but neither statute permits an injunction to be issued prohibiting the future use by a
merchant of a deceptive practice which he has used in the past but
which he is no longer using or cannot be shown to be contemplating.
Thus it may be possible for a dealer, by desisting temporarily from
the illegal conduct, to defeat the issuance of an injunction unless
the attorney general can show that there is teason to believe that the
dealer's deceptive practices will continue. In order to make such a
showing, the attorney general would have to overcome difficult evidentiary problems. The CSG statute, however, allows an injunction
to be based on past actions as well as on present and future actions.322
Indeed, there is no compelling reason to shield fraudulent merchants
from an injunction simply because they have temporarily ceased using their deceptive practices. A deceptive-practices statute, then,
should allow injunctive orders to be drawn broadly enough to prohibit all future use not only of those deceptive practices that are
occurring or are about to occur, but also of those deceptive practices
in which the merchant has engaged in the past.323 Such an order
would provide maximum protection to the public without encroaching upon any protected rights of the accused dealer.
Furthermore, a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute should
ensure not only that fraudulent practices are discontinued, but also
that defrauded victims get their money back. Too many existing
"consumer protection" statutes do not provide complete protection
to consumers, since they provide only for an injunction of deceptive
practices and do not make a corresponding effort to allow the attorney general to seek restitution or some other form of relief for defrauded victims.324 In this regard, the FTC statute leaves much to
be desired; it stipulates that a court may issue an injunction when it
finds that a practice violative of the act is occurring or is about to
occur, but it does not permit the court to provide the defrauded
consumers with any form of relief. 325 The remedial provision contained in the CSG act, however, does provide substantial relief to
321. ITC UNIFORM Acr § 5; NCCUSL Acr § 5(a)(l).
322. CSG Acr § 5.
323. Whether the injunction is based only on present and future deceptive praC•
tices or whether it is based also on past practices, it is clear that the court is not limited to prohibiting merely the precise act which violated the statute. It may also
enjoin related practices. See ITC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392-95 (1965).
324. See HAWAII REv. LAWS § 205A-13 (Supp. 1965); IowA CODE § 713 (1966); N.Y.
ExEc. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1969); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 18.86.080 (Supp.
1968).
325. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 5. The provision does allow the issuance of an injunction
without a showing of persistent or continuous fraudulent conduct, as is required by
some statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1969). The provision
also does not require a showing that the dealer acted with an intent that others rely.
Some statutes do require probable reliance by a consumer. See, e.g., Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, § 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
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defrauded consumers. Under that act, a court may issue, along with
the injunction, an order requiring the dealer to return to a defrauded
consumer all money or property acquired from the consumer through
the use of the fraudulent practice.326 In order to implement that
order, the court may appoint a receiver to gather the assets of the
defendant and to pay out those assets to injured customers. The
NCCUSL act contains similar provisions for granting restitution, 327
but such a remedy is conditioned upon a showing by the administrator either that the supplier knew or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known that the acts involved were deceptive, or else that
he knew that they were unconscionable.328 Thus the administrator
is forced to show not only the fact that the acts were committed by
the supplier and were deceptive, but also the state of mind of the
supplier. Since in the normal case the administrator's staff is insufficient and overworked, this necessity will probably lead to much less
litigation and thus to much less relief for defrauded consumers.320
There seems to be no sound reason for exempting innocent conduct
from nonpunitive sanctions.330 The purpose of a deceptive-practice
statute is not to prosecute the dishonest merchant in a criminal sense,
but to protect the public from conduct that is deceptive or unconscionable. This section of the NCCUSL act is particularly illogical in
that the harshest sanction-the injunction with its 5,000 dollars per
day fine for violation-is imposed on innocent violators, whereas
lesser restrictions are reserved for the violator meeting a higher
standard of culpability.
In addition to providing nonpunitive remedies-injunction and
restitution-for all types of violations, a deceptive-practices statute
should contain a penalty for willful violations of its terms. The only
one of the proposed statutes that does so is the CGS act which imposes
a fine of 200 dollars for each willful violation of the statute.331 Simply
ordering the willful violator to cease his deceptive practice and to
326. CSG Acr § 6; see Mo. .ANN. STAT.

§

407.100 (Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN,

§ 56:8-8 (1964).

327. NCCUSL Acr § 5.
328. NCCUSL Acr §§ 5(b), (2)(b). This standard exempts innocent conduct from
any sanction except the injunction.
329. See text accompanying note 16-33 supra. If the administrator does not have
available sufficient clerical, legal, and investigative personnel, even his discovery and
subpoena powers will often be insufficient to obtain the evidence needed to show intent. In addition, even in those cases in which the practice involved is blatant enough
to allow a presumption of knowledge, there may be problems concerning the liability
of a supplier for acts of his agents.
330. Of course, since these merchants are innocent, they should be e."<empt from
punitive sanctions. See text accompanying notes 331·32 infra.
331. CSG Acr § 15(c). A willful violation occurs when the merchant "knew or
should have known bis conduct was a violation of section 2 of this act." This standard
is precisely the same as the one which the NCCUSL act establishes for obtaining any
relief other than an injunction.
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make restitution to the consumer, and not also imposing a separate
fine for the violation, would have little deterrent effect upon the continuation of illegal practices by dealers, especially if the scope of the
court's order is limited to the precise deceptive practice involved in
the case.832 In this regard the distinction between willful and negligent conduct is justified. A dealer intentionally committing deceptive
practices and defrauding consumers should not be given a statutory
guarantee that he faces no greater risks than that of the compelled
termination of the particular practice in which he is found to have
engaged, and that of the loss of the benefits which he has obtained
through the violation.
The drafters of the model acts recognized that adjudication in a
court is often a costly and lengthy process. Hence, they sought to
provide some alternative means of resolving the many cases that
might arise under the statute but do not involve serious infractions
and do not necessarily require court action. The three acts adopt the
same method for dealing with such cases: each provides that the attorney general can, at his discretion, accept an assurance of discontinuance from the dealer in lieu of further enforcement proceedings.333 The filing of an assurance by the dealer does not constitute
an admission of guilt, and the assurance itself is not usable as evidence of the dealer's misconduct in any subsequent proceeding. Nevertheless, under the NCCUSL act, breach of an assurance is treated
in the same manner as is breach of an injunction.334 The other two
acts contain less stringent provisions which simply state that, if an
assurance is breached, the attorney general has the opportunity to
reopen the case closed by the acceptance of the assurance. 335 Another
provision unique to the NCCUSL act is its requirement that an assurance provide for the return of money to defrauded consumers.336
Such a provision is desirable, since it allows the attorney general to
avoid the time and expense of litigation and at the same time does
not sacrifice the interests of the complaining consumers.
All three acts require that, after an assurance is submitted, it must
332. See note 323 supra.
333. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 6; CSG Acr § 10; NCCUSL Acr § 5(d).
334. NCCUSL Acr § 5(d).
335. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 6; CSG Acr § 10.
336. NCCUSL Acr § 5(d). Section 4(c)(6) .of the same act allows an investigation
into the practices of a specific supplier to be terminated upon acceptance of an assurance of discontinuance. Under that section, the assurance may be conditioned upon
return of money to the consumers damaged by the supplier's deceptive practices, but
there is no requirement, as there is in § 5(d), that a determination be made concerning
the appropriateness of restitution. In addition, court approval of an assurance is not
required, as it is under § 5(d). The more logical approach seems to be to amend § 5(d)
to include termination of investigations as well as enforcement proceedings, thus providing the same requirements for each. Obviously if the investigation determines only
that a deceptive practice has been committed and does not reveal any defrauded consumers, no restitution would be necessary until such consumers are ascertained.
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be filed with, and approved by, a court of general jurisdiction,887
presumably to ensure that the public interest is protected by the attorney general's disposition of the case. In practice, however, this
approval procedure is likely to become nothing more than a clerical
ritual. The acts should therefore be amended to pern1it interested
parties to intervene if they are not satisfied with the tetn1s of the
assurance. Such a section would constitute a meaningful check upon
less than vigorous administrative action.
A section providing for an assurance procedure is vital to the
effective functioning of a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute.
In light of the delays and costs that attend judicial proceedings, it
would be virtually impossible for an attorney general to do an adequate job of enforcing such a statute if he were compelled to vindicate every legitimate complaint in a court of law. The assurance
procedure allows the attorney general to deal with the bulk of the
routine cases in a summary manner, and it reserves adjudicatory proceedings for particularly serious violators. Moreover, if the assurance
provisions are strict-as they are in the NCCUSL model act-little
is sacrificed in the way of deterrence of future conduct or in the way
of relief to consumers. The use of the assurance procedure also adds
vigor to the mediation procedure, which is already present in most
states,338 but which by itself is not broad or forceful enough to curb
all deceptive practices. 839 The possibility that a merchant would be
compelled to submit an assurance in order to avoid an injunction,
and the stringent penalties for the violation of the assurance, provide a strong inducement for the merchant to agree to a settlement.840
The utility of having an assurance procedure in conjunction with
mediation is exemplified by the experience in states which have already enacted comprehensive deceptive-practices legislation providing for both of these inforn1al procedures. Although the attorney
general in such states is given broad injunctive powers, very little
337. FTC UNIFORM Am: § 6; CSG Am: § IO; NCCUSL Am: § 5(d). Under the
NCCUSL act, the court must determine that a provision for restitution has been made
part of the assurance.
338. Mediation will probably be carried on in those states with consumer fraud
bureaus even if the bureau is not charged with enforcing a deceptive-practices statute.
See notes 265-75 supra and accompanying text. Saxbe, The Role of the Government
in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the
Ohio Attorney General, 29 OHl0 ST. L.J. 897 (1968).
339. Mediation by itself is not effective to ensure that merchants desist from prohibited conduct, nor does it operate to return money to all defrauded consumers. No
matter how persuasive the Attorney General may be, many habitually fraudulent
dealers will refuse to settle. Platsis Interview, supra note 44.
340. The advantage of having several levels of activity, with greater sanctions at
each, is that such flexibility provides needed leverage to the administrator. Habitual
violators in Detroit do not settle because they do not fear any real sanctions unless
their conduct is blatant enough to come under one 0£ the criminal statutes; even then
the possibility of penalty no more severe than a fine does not have much deterrent
effect. Providing the administrator with considerable authority and discretion will
make the less formal remedies, such as mediation, viable.

April 1970]

Comments

981

actual litigation takes place and most of the cases are settled either
by mediation or by assurances. 341
In addition to granting to the attorney general a broad array of
enforcement powers, a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute
should grant a defrauded consumer effective private remedies that
he can invoke without the approval or the cooperation of state lawenforcement officials. The defrauded consumer should not be forced
to rely completely upon some governmental official in order to obtain relief; different officials have different attitudes about consumer
affairs, and an attorney general unsympathetic to the plight of defrauded consumers could, by adopting a policy of inaction, enfeeble
even the most stringent and pervasive deceptive-practices statute.
Moreover, even if the attorney general is earnestly committed to a
policy of attacking consumer fraud, it does not seem likely that the
state legislature-in light of the usual scarcity of financial resources
available for governmental expenditures-would provide the funds
necessary for an effective antifraud effort. Thus, in order to make a
deceptive-practices statute truly effective, a provision for private
remedies must be included in the statute in order to complement
the state enforcement provisions.342
The FTC proposed act does not grant any private. remedies to
the consumer. The NCCUSL act and the CSG act, on the other hand,
provide that any dealer who violates the act is liable for damages to
341. The vast majority of cases in such states are settled informally, through mediation or administrative action. Litigation involves only about 5% of the disputes. See
Mindel, The New York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection-A Review of Its
Consumer Protection Activities, 11 N.Y.L.F. 603-04 (1965): Rice, supra note 302, at 590
n.133.
342. A special committee of the Antitrust Section of the ABA has recently recommended that Congress enact legislation empowering the FTC to award damages to
consumers after a successful prosecution by the Commission or the Justice Department.
The ABA proposal would preclude private class actions by consumers both before and
after governmental action. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1970, § C at 30, col. I. An advantage
of this proposal is that it avoids both lengthy litigation and large attorneys fees.
However, the consumers' action is tied to two federal agencies that may or may not
share the views of the low-income consumer concerning the need for the action. The
proposed remedy would be viable only if the consumer possessed the right to maintain
a class action independent of any government action. Both the NCCUSL and CSG acts
permit consumer class actions. See note 354 infra and accompanying text. There should
be a requirement, however, that the attorney general be informed of the institution
of any private suit under the act; this requirement would help to minimize duplication
of effort. The attorney general should also be allowed to intervene in private suits
with the approval of the plaintiffs; such intervention would be warranted if a particularly large violator is the defendant or if the defendant's actions involve various
parts of the state. The need for private remedial actions in the consumer protection
field is reinforced by the financial inability of state enforcement to cope with the
problem. This necessity can be illustrated by analogy to the enforcement of antitrust
laws. It has been estimated that in order to obtain the current level of enforcement
of antitrust legislation without private antitrust suits, the Justice Department Antitrust
Division would have to increase its staff fourfold. See Barber, Private Enforcement of
the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson Patman Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181,
183-84 n.10 (1961); Spanogle, The UJC-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?,
29 Omo ST. L.J. 624, 627 n.14 (1968).
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consumers injured by the violation.343 Furthermore, each of those
two acts stipulates that any judgment against a dealer which is issued
by a court in enforcement proceedings initiated by the administrator
of the act, is prima fade evidence of the dealer's liability when that
judgment is raised as evidence in a subsequent suit brought by a
consumer whom the dealer has defrauded. 344 Both the NCCUSL act
and the CSG act provide for a very small minimum damage award
which is to be granted to any successful plaintiff; one hundred dollars
is the minimum award under the former act345 and uv-o hundred
dollars is the award under the latter.346 The CSG act authorizes the
court in its discretion to award punitive damages as well. 347
It is doubtful that the possibility of obtaining nominal minimum
damages would by itself provide the needed incentive for attorneys
and individual consumers to become involved in the lengthy and
burdensome process of litigation.348 Most consumer fraud suits involve relatively small amounts of money. Thus there is little likelihood in most cases that compensatory damages will exceed the
amount provided for by the minimum awards. As a result, the
amount of remuneration obtainable by an attorney operating on a
contingent-fee basis would in most cases probably not be sufficient
to motivate trial attorneys to leave the more lucrative fields of personal-injury and products-liability litigation. Yet making the minimum award high enough to lure attorneys into the business of representing defrauded consumers would probably put too great a strain
on commerce.
One way to make consumer fraud suits attractive to lawyers might
be to include a provision in a deceptive-practices statute calling for
the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to successful litigants. Both
the CSG act and the NCCUSL act authorize such an award, but they
do so under different circumstances. The CSG act simply states that
the court may award such fees 349 but it offers no guidelines to the
judge concerning when such an award should be made. In light of
the traditional reluctance of judges to award attorneys' fees without
specific guidelines,350 this provision may not stimulate many lawyers
to undertake suits on behalf of defrauded consumers.
343. NCCUSL Am: § 7; CSG Am: § 8.
344. NCCUSL Am: § 7(d); CSG Acr § 8(e).
345. NCCUSL Am: § 7(a)(I).
346. CSG Am: § 8(a).
347. CSG Am: § 8(b).
348. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev.
I, 46-48 (1969).
349. CSG Am: § 8(d).
350. Attorneys' fees have been traditionally regarded as extraordinary damages and
have not been included in compensatory or punitive-damage awards. See Rice, supra
note 302, at 570.
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The NCCUSL act is more definitive and allows an award of
attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff if the defendant-dealer knew
or should have known, at the time he committed the violation of the
act, that his illegal conduct was deceptive, or if he knew at that time
that his illegal conduct was unconscionable.351 Under the NCCUSL
act, therefore, every successful litigant is entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees, since knowledge is an essential element of an offense
under the act. 362 Ideally, a provision calling for an award of attorneys'
fees should be broadly framed so as to afford plaintiffs the opportunity to recover fees in any successful action that arises under the
statute. Such a provision would make legitimate consumer suits
financially attractive to lawyers and would thus provide defrauded
consumers with greater opportuity to undertake productive litigation
against dishonest merchants.
Because of the inefficiency of having a separate action for each
of a large number of consumer complaints against a particular merchant, it would be useful to provide some means by which consumers
could join together in a single action against a merchant who had
defrauded them. The method most often discussed is that of a consumer class action.353 Such a class action would offer several advantages: (1) it would allow consumers to combine claims so that the
full extent of the defendant-dealer's wrongdoing is presented before
the court; (2) it would enable consumers, particularly those with low
incomes, to utilize scarce legal talent to their best advantage; (3)
it would encourage attorneys to undertake consumer suits because of
the possibility of significant remuneration; (4) it would enable neighborhood legal clinics and other groups concerned about consumer
affairs to bring against flagrantly dishonest merchants suits alleging
a multitude of violations; and (5) it would eliminate wasteful multiplicity of actions.
The NCCUSL act and the CGS act include provisions that permit
consumer class actions. 3 :;4 Under those two statutes, the court can give
injunctive relief to the class even though the individual consumers
in the class may have an adequate remedy at law.355 Some commentators feel that consumer class actions may be possible even without
351. NCCUSL Ac:r § 7(c)(2). The standard for awarding attorneys' fees is the same
as that for maintaining a successful action under the act. See note 320 supra and accompanying text.
352. See note 320 supra and accompanying text.
353. See Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 80 (1969); Rice, supra note 302, at 579-83; Starrs, The Consumer
Class Action-Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U. L. REv. 211 (1969); Starrs, The
Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U. L. REv. 407
(1969).
354. CSG Ac:r § 8(b); NCCUSL Ac:r § 7{a)(2), (3).
355. CSG Ac:r § 8(b); NCCUSL Ac:r § 7{a)(2).
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statutory change; 356 but a true class action, 357 at least in Michigan,
is probably not possible without legislative authorization.358 There is
a possibility that the availability of consumer class actions would encourage unethical attorneys to solicit claims or to encourage frivolous
suits.3119 But such unethical practices could be minimized through the
use of adequate discovery devices and through supervision of the
conduct of attorneys by courts and bar associations.
It would be a mistake to view the passage of a comprehensive
deceptive-practices statute in Michigan as a panacea for the problem
of fraud in the market place. If such a statute is enacted, it will then
be necessary for the legislature to turn its attention to the matter of
adequately funding the office of the Attorney General so that its
Consumer Fraud Bureau may be staffed with enough attorneys to
administer the statute effectively. In addition, the legislature will
356. Starrs, supra note 353; Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U. CHI, L. R.Ev. 590 (1966) (dealing with consumer actions for
injunctions).
357. A true class action is one in which the right to be enforced is joint or common,
or in which the right is secondary "in that the owner of the primary right refuses to
enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it."
MicH. CT. R. 208.1(1). The advantage of this type of action is that nonparty members
of the class are bound by the judgment and thus do not have to relitigate. See MICH.
CT. R. 605-06. International Typographical Union v. Macomb Co., 306 Mich. 562, 11
N.W.2d 242 (1943).
358. See Starrs, supra note 353. Professor Starrs deals with class actions both for
injunctive relief and for damages. The problem which a class faces in obtaining injunctive relief is the same as that faced by individuals-the normal equity requirement
that one seeking such an order be threatened with prospective injury and have no
adequate remedy at law. The consumer who has already been injured does not face
future fraudulent dealings by the same merchant, and he, at least in theory, has a
common-law action for damages. There seems to be no question that in Michigan
consumers can band together to seek injunctive relief [see Dole, supra note 355, at
107-09], but it seems unlikely they can present a suitable case, absent statutory reform,
for enjoining future deceptive practices. It also seems unlikely that a group of con•
sumers who are attempting to obtain damage awards based upon separate transactions
with the same dealer will be successful in utilizing a true class action. When no common right is involved, but only common questions of fact or of law-as in the typical
consumer fraud case-the class action will probably be considered "spurious." Dole,
supra note 353, at 94. The "spurious" class action is thought to be merely a joinder
device, binding only those members of the class who are parties to the litigation.
J. HONIGMAN &: c. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RUI.ES ANNOTATED 605 (1962). There is
the possibility that a spurious action could be converted into a true classification if
the plaintiffs give notice of the suit to all the members of the class. MICH, CT. R. 208.4
provides that the court may order that notice be given to absent parties in order to
protect the interests of the class. Since the plaintiffs will probably not have knowledge
of all the consumers who have dealt with a merchant, it should also be possible under
this rule to require the defendant to provide names and addresses of such individuals.
Even if such a requirement is not possible, however, several consumers should be able
to join as plaintiffs to facilitate suit against a single defendant. MICH. CT. R. 206 provides that parties may join as plaintiffs even when there are no longer questions of
fact or law so long as the administration of justice will be facilitated and the defendant
will not be prejudiced. In any event, it appears that lawyers for the poor, including
those in Detroit, have not attempted in any significant way to use this potentially
powerful tool. Starrs, supra note 356, at 509; Donnelly Interview, supra note 98.
-359_ K.ripke, supra note 348, at 48; Starrs, supra note 356, at 409.
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have to consider ways of implementing consumer education programs
-particularly in inner-city areas-so that consumers will be able to
utilize the increased protection afforded to them by the statute. Furthermore, it seems certain that, so long as poverty exists in society,
there will be an inordinate number of unscrupulous merchants preying upon poor artd ignorant consumers.
Nevertheless, the initial step is the enactment of a statute that
provides the enforcement officials in the state with the legal armaments necessary to wage an effective battle against consumer fraud.
The enactment of such a statute would significantly improve the
stature of Michigan's consumer protection efforts and would be a
welcome sign to those whom affluence has left behind, that government has not forgotten their plight.

